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States to which imperial Spain bequeathed suchan indelible legacy. The
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become unavailable, with these out-of-print issues accessible at high
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growing population desirous of becoming better informed concerning
New Mexico, the need to provide availability to such important material
became apparent.
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DISASTER AT WHITE TAIL:
THE FORT SILL APACHES' FIRST TEN YEARS
AT MESCALERO, 1913-1923
JOHN A. TURCHENESKE

the early morning hours of Friday, April 4, 1913, the
Rock Island Railway special train bearing 163 Chiricahua Apache
prisoners of war rumbled south toward the Sacramento Mountains as it skirted past the Valley of the Fires' eastern rim. As the
train slowly crawled to a halt in the sleepy New Mexico hamlet of
Tularosa, the twenty-seven-year period of captivity experienced
by a number of these Indians came to an end. I In 1886, charged
with allegedly abetting Geronimo and his fellow belligerents, the
military uprooted these particular individuals from their San
Carlos and Fort Apache, Arizona homes. In point of fact, none of
those Chiricahuas removed to Fort Marion, Florida and subsequently transferred to Mount Vernon Barracks, Alabama in 1887
were guilty of armed insurrection. For reasons of political expediency none would ever be returned to Arizona.
Younger members of this forlorn band had been born into captivity while the Chiricahuas were held for twenty years at Fort
Sill, Oklahoma, from which all of these Indians had come. Generally known as the Fort Sill Apaches, the Chiricahuas were about
to be amalgamated with the Mescalero Apaches. Shortly after
detraining, Major George W. Goode, their officer in charge,
returned these Indians to the Interior Department's jurisdiction,
thus officially releasing the Chiricahuas from their odious status
as prisoners of war. 2 Their reputation somewhat altered by a prolonged period of confinement, the Chiricahuas, in the custody of
agent Clarence R. Jefferis, journeyed to the Mescalero Indian
Reservation as the "best bunch of Indians in the country."3
DuRING
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Yet the Chiricahuas did not necessarily share the moment's euphoria, for their odyssey to New Mexico was born of desperation.
When the Chiricahuas were removed from Alabama to Fort Sill in
1894, they were promised freedom and permanent allotment at
that installation "if they behaved themselves."4 Consequently,
scrupulously avoiding breaches of discipline, they conscientiously
adhered to their captors' program of civilization and diligently
labored to place themselves in an economic position to handle
such allotments. Contrary to one Indian Office operative's observation that allotment of Mescaleros would provide a salutary example for the Fort Sill Apaches,s the Chiricahuas, at the time of
their removal from Fort Sill, were basically self-sufficient and able
to make their way in the white man's world if properly supported
by the Indian Bureau. They had become experienced cattlemen
with approximately 10,500 head of high grade Herefords worth
well over $300,000. Had Fort Sill been abandoned and given over
to the Chiricahuas as originally intended, these Indians in time
would have become one of Oklahoma's wealthiest tribes. 6
Yet promises of permanent homes, allotment and freedom at
Fort Sill were never realized. By 1903 military officials decided to
retain Fort Sill for future artillery training. Geronimo's demise in
1909 eradicated most of the opposition emanating from New Mexico to Chiricahua resettlement in that territory. With this obstacle
finally removed, War Department personnel were easily enabled
by instilling fear, suspicion and deep despair among the Chiricahuas that they would never receive Fort Sill as earlier promised
them, to convince most of these Indians that relocation to Mescalero would be in their best interest. Relentlessly pressured by the
military to make this decision, those Chiricahuas, too weak to
withstand such onslaughts and longing for freedom and a home to
call their own, eventually clamored for resettlement at Mescalero.
There immediately ensued a four-year acrimonious struggle between the War and Interior Departments over which settlement
policies would be pursued. Although Interior's efforts to maintain
the Chiricahuas at Fort Sill came to naught, in the compromise
agreement which followed, that Department's Indian rights activist allies 7 exacted a guarantee that those Chiricahuas choosing
Mescalero as their new home would be placed in as good an eco-
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nomic condition as they had known at Fort Sill. 8 Tragically, this
pledge was also to remain unfulfilled. What befell those Chiricahuas who came to New Mexico during their subsequent ten-year
period of severe impoverishment at the Mescalero Indian Reservation amply demonstrates why, removal importunities to the contrary, the Fort Sill Apaches had every reason to question whether
the latest promises made them regarding their well-being at Mescalero would come to pass. 9 Developments which unfolded after
their arrival in New Mexico would also illustrate why, in reality,
many of these Indians hated to leave and were apprehensive of
departing Fort Sill, as well as why they never considered themselves truly free 10 upon release from their status as prisoners of
war, and why they regretted coming to Mescalero. II
Initially, at least, these Indians' friends cautiously expressed optimism over the Chiricahuas' future at Mescalero. Missionaries of
the Reformed Church in America believed that Fort Sill Apaches'
release from captivity was an event of great import. 12 Echoing this
view, members of the Board of Indian Commissioners believed the
Chiricahuas' resettlement at Mescalero was transacted "in a manner highly creditable to the Government." This move provided a
means for these Indians' proper civilization and development. At
the same time, Board members urged Indian Office personnel to
exert every effort to develop the Chiricahuas' sense of independence and responsibility and "prevent anything like a backward industrial tendency or a going back from individualistic to tribal
customs. "13
Slightly over a month after the Chiricahuas' arrival in New
Mexico, Major Goode returned to Mescalero for a six-day tour of
inspection relative to the progress made by his furmer charges. His
report sounded a note of caution. While Goode found them cheerful and orderly, they as yet had not been settled in any permanent
location on the reservation. Rather, they continued to be encamped at the agency headquarters, and thus were most inte'rested
in being finally situated at their new homes. Goode believed they
could best be satisfied and encouraged by being so located with as
little delay as possible. Since Mescalero afforded a fine cattle
range, their money should be invested in stock. "In their present
frame of mind," said Goode, these Indians would continue to pro-

112

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW 53:2 1978

gress if encouraged and given the opportunity. Were the Chiricahuas "discouraged by delays or failure to realize their hopes they
will drift back into old vicious habits, and become worthless and
troublesome." One way to accomplish the objectives set for the
Fort Sill Apaches was to allow agent Jefferis a free hand in the administration of these Indians' affairs by exempting him from Indian Office regulations which might hamper such management. l '
On the other hand, there were reports of a more propitious nature. Prior to the Chiricahuas' removal to Mescalero, New Mexico's Senators Albert B. Fall and Thomas B. Catron and their
stockmen constituents opposed such transfer. Ostensibly, their
protests were based on a fear of renewed Apache hostilities. Actually, these maneuvers were designed to protect their reservation
grazing leases. ls Fortunately, no reports of "open outbreak of hostilities between the Indians and white settlers as was alleged to be
feared by New Mexican politicians and cattlemen" came from
Mescalero. 16
Evidence soon surfaced that such fears were absolutely without
foundation. "From all accounts," said Brigadier General Hugh L.
Scott, the "only dissatisfied people over the situation are Senators
Fall and Catron." Actually, New Mexico as a whole cared nothing
"about the matter one way or another. . . . Far from deluging
this country once more in blood as we used to read in the Senatorial screeds last fall," Scott said, the Chiricahuas were "looking
for some baseball club to tread on their coattails when the only
blood likely to flow would be that of the umpire." 17
In mid-May, the first battle the Chiricahuas found themselves
engaged in since their arrival at Mescalero was a baseball contest
held in Cloudcroft with that city's team. According to the sports
columnist for the Weekly Cloudcrofter, the game was an "easy
victory for the Indians, the score standing 22 to 2 in their favor."
Continuing, the columnist noted that "numerous errors on the
part of the Cloudcroft team were responsible for the defeat." Actually, the "Fort Sill boys romped around the diamond and ran
scores while some of the Cloudcroft boys were trying to put the
ball somewhere-just where was not always plain." Goodwill was
further manifested since "no one wanted to 'kill the umpire' or
scalp anybody," and thus the "game passed off pleasantly."
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Reports were that the "visitors expressed themselves as being
highly pleased with the courteous treatment shown them while
here and no doubt they will be back again."IB Referring to the
Chiricahuas' return engagement in July, Scott observed that such
a felicitous outcome directly contradicted Fall's predictions of
renewed carnage in New Mexico and Arizona. 19
Yet for all this, the Chiricahuas faced serious difficulties, many
of which would not be resolved for decades. By September, for example, these Indians had still to be permanently placed in their
new homes in the reservation's White Tail Canyon district.
Located approximately twenty miles northeast of the Mescalero
Agency, White Tail was a narrow eight-mile-long valley over
seven thousand feet in elevation which periodically suffered severe
winter cold, heavy snowfalls, late and early frosts and occasional
spring and summer droughts. As a reason for placing the Chiricahuas at this site, Jefferis advised his superiors that White Tail was
the only area on the reservation that remained unoccupied. As
matters stood, wells for drinking water, stock tanks, roads and
houses were only partially constructed, and in some cases not even
begun. Also, the Chiricahuas were unable to take advantage of the
current growing season. Only now was ground being broken on an
extremely limited amount of arable land which was not subject to
irrigation. Even then, since the period in which crops' could be
made was of short'duration, all that might be raised were small
grains and vegetables. 20
In this regard, Jefferis sounded an ominous note. It would be absolutely impossible for the Chiri~ahuas to sustain themselves
economically solely on agriculturaifmrsuits. Their major source
of income would have to be realized from a prospective cattle industry, which the government had a definite moral and legal obligation to fund initially. As such, Jefferis and his successors would
continuously plead for just such a program. Were the government
not desirous of providing the necessary monies outright for this
purpose, then a loan could be made using the reservation's timber
resources as collateral. In this way, both Mescaleros and the Fort
Sill Apaches would be highly benefitted. 2 1
Another serious difficulty which confronted Jefferis and his successors was the matter of those monies belonging to the Chirica-
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Map of the Mescalero Reservation, showing the relationship of the White Tail
Allotment to the reservation and to Ruidoso. Courtesy the National Archives and
Records Center.
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huas, which by mutual War and Interior Department agreement
were to redound to both tribes' benefit. Contrary to Goode's expectations,the Indian Office rigidly regulated Jefferis' administration of the Chiricahuas' funds. 22 Fortunately for these Indians,
after several months' delays they received their individual shares
in the $171,172.03 realized as their portion of those proceeds accruing from the recent sale of the Chiricahuas' cattle herd at Fort
Sill,23 Yet there still remained the matter of the General Apache
Fund, totalling nearly $30,000, which was to be made available
for purchase of cattle for both Mescaleros and Fort Sill Apaches
relocated in New Mexico. 24 Tragically, there is no extant evidence
that these monies were ever turned over to the Mescaleros for this
purpose, a situation which only compounded the problem of establishing them on an economically viable plane of existence.
While the Chiricahuas patiently awaited what had been promised them at Mescalero,25 an obstacle of a more sinister nature
lurked on the horizon. Still angered by the Fort Sill Apaches'
removal to New Mexico, Senator Fall vigorously renewed his campaign to turn the Mescalero Indian Reservation into a national
park. 26 In addition to protecting friends' and relatives' grazing
leases at this location, Fall's latest covert purpose in pressing this
issue was to obtain rights and royalties on minerals extracted at
Mescalero. Mary W. Roe, a Reformed Church missionary, advised
Edgar B. Meritt of the Indian Office that Fall would never rest until he met with success in this matter. 27
According to Major Goode, favorable action on Fall's national
park scheme would be a crime against the Chiricahuas and Mescaleros. Were the Indian Office to carry out its obligations to both
tribal groups and properly develop the reservation, they would
"be well off and prosperous in a few years." These Indians would
be ruined if Fall's bill became law. "On whatever pretext white
men are permitted to get a foothold on the Mescalero reservation,
no matter how fair sounding may be the terms of the provision
granting it, the fact will be a menace to their rights" and the initial step will have been "taken in what will eventually be their undoing." Goode urged friends of the Indian to prevent this from
happening. 28
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Shortly, Goode would have additional words of caution on the
Fort Sill Apaches' situation at Mescalero. In the company of
General Scott, Goode arrived at the reservation on October 8 for
the purpose of observing conditions which confronted the Chiricahuas. Goode advised U.S. Indian Commissioner Cato Sells that
many of these Indians appeared "satisfied with the prospect ahead
of them" but expressed impatience over delays in meeting their
immediate needs, especially on the issue of clothing, a commodity
which they desperately needed. Only thirty families were assigned
farms at White Tail and cunstruction on twenty-five houses had
yet to be commenced. Families not yet located at White Tail
would have to remain at the agency and live in tents during the
winter. These could not possibly be relocated until summer.
Scott shared with Goode "great confidence in the ultimate success and prosperity of these Indians," provided they were "established under such favorable conditions as are obviously possible at
this time; and with as little further delay as possible." To ensure
their economic well-being, Goode urged that the range be stocked
with cattle and that an adequate water supply be developed using
wells and tanks. Health facilities were needed to treat pneumonia.
In order to meet these needs, Jefferis needed the Indian Office's
support and a free hand in the administration of reservation affairs. Goode strongly hinted that "prompt action now in developing conditions at Mescalero will meet with response from the Indians which will bring success and prosperity to these people."
Otherwise, continued delay would only "discourage them and
engender discontent with attendant evils, and make the task of the
superintendent very difficult, if not impossible. "29
Writing to Colonel Edwin St. John Greble immediately thereafter, the sense of urgency expressed by Goode for his former
charges was somewhat stronger. Reiterating the points covered in
his letter to Sells, Goode explained that his object in requesting
Scott to accompany him to Mescalero was to make the Chiricahuas "feel that the War Department was interested in them-to
reassure them and give them encouragement, notwithstanding the
delays which tend to make them restless." Yet Goode wished it
were "possible to impress upon the Commissioner," whom he
believed was "much interested in these Indians," how important it
was to achieve "results at Mescalero with as little additional delay
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as possible." Were the Chiricahuas "to back-slide, because of
delay in developing conditions they have been waiting for, their
demoralization will be very rapid; the whole Mescalero tribe will
be affected, and the superintendent will be up against a hard proposition." Such would not come to pass if the reservation was wellstocked with cattle, for there would "be plain sailing; and those
Indians will be self-supporting and prosperous in a few years. "30
Greble, who was instrumental in establishing the field artillery
school at Fort Sill, the construction of which finally forced the
Chiricahuas off the installation, immediately transmitted Goode's
communication to Major General Leonard Wood, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff. Wood, who had held this position since 1910 and
had been directly involved in suppressing the last of Geronimo's
belligerancies in 1886,31 requested the Interior Secretary to bring
this urgent matter to Sells' attention. Sells, said Wood, should
exert "special effort. . . to comply as promptly as possible with
the promises made the Indians who went to Mescalero; that is,
that they would be settled upon farms and be given an opportunity
to earn a living, and that they would be rationed, clothed and sheltered until they had an opportunity to realize upon their first
crops. "32
Interior's reply failed to assure interested military personnel
that arrangements made by both departments for the benefit of
those Chiricahuas who relocated at Mescalero were being fulfilled
properly. War Department officials learned that only blankets and
shoes were authorized for shipment and that other matters pertaining to the Fort Sill Apaches "are being handled as expeditiously as possible."33 Upon being informed of Interior's response,
Major Goode observed that the "Indian Office has gingered up a
little." Goode hoped "they will do the right thing by Jefferis and
give him a chance to work out that proposition at Mescalero."34
Goode's expectation in this regard was not to be realized. Attempting to facilitate Chiricahua resettlement at White Tail, Jefferis begged Indian Office superiors in January 1914, for farm
machinery, housing appliances, an increase of beef and other food
rations and adequate hospital facilities. 35 Reformed Church missionaries believed the Chiricahuas' future at Mescalero was uncertain since provisions for their permanent establishment were
either slow or "constantly deferred. "36 Matters became even more
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The Fort Sill Apaches' baseball team. Courtesy the U.S. Army Field Artillery and Fort Sill
Museum.
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uncertain when Senator Fall reintroduced his measure to tum
Mescalero into a natiorial park. 37
Vigorously protesting this move, Father William H. Ketcham,
S.J., a member of the Board of Indian Commissioners, urged upon
completion of his January 1914 visit to Mescalero that an appropriation sufficient to establish both Mescaleros and Chiricahuas in
the cattle raising business be allocated these Indians so they might
become economically self-sustaining. 38 Jefferis concurred with this
view and further observed that the Indian Office's efforts in this
direction were substantially lacking. 39 Since it was "obvious to
anyone that an Indian cannot make his living from a tract of
land" which did not exceed fifteen acres for each individual, Jefferis advocated stocking Mescalero, which contained "one of the
finest . . . ranges in the country," with a minimum of twelve
thousand head of cattle. Furthermore, if white permittees, whose
leases had not yet been extinguished as earlier proposed, were
making substantial profits from their sheep and cattle interests,
then "why shouldn't the Indians' grass be eaten by Indian cattle
and the profits therefrom accrue to the Indians?"40
An appropriation of $200,000 would provide a good beginning
for their cattle industry.41 If necessary, Jefferis suggested, these
and additional monies required for this purpose could be allocated
on a loan basis, "to be secured by the timber on the reservation,
which is valued at three and a half million dollars. "42 Stocking of
the reservation with cattle, said Jefferis, "was cited as one of the
advantages that would be enjoyed by the Fort Sills who elected to
remove to Mescalero." These Indians came to New Mexico anticipating a prosperous future inasmuch as they left Oklahoma with
the "full expectation of being just as well, if not better, situated."
Jefferis wondered what their feeling might be "when they find that
all there is for them here is a small piece 6f farm land which, work
as hard as they may, cannot be made to produce enough to keep
them and their families in food and clothing." Were Congress not
to provide even a reimbursable appropriation with which to stock
Mescalero with cattle, Jefferis could not see "what is to become of
them."43
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Holding a similar view of the situation, James Mooney, the
noted ethnologist, definitely believed the Chiricahuas were removed to the wrong place. 44 They were, said Mooney, making a
new beginning under adverse conditions and in "forced companionship with people, who although cognate, are their hereditary
enemies." Mooney believed that the only logical location for these
people was in Arizona. Since their fighting days were long over,
and many were already of the second generation, Mooney was
skeptical that the government could not relocate "fifty families in
their native environment. "45
Had the Chiricahuas been given the opportunity to decide
whether to relocate in Arizona, Mooney believed most of these Indians would have desired to make such a move. As matters stood,
said Mooney, "we see a decimated remnant officially cut off from
their own kindred and further cut into two parts, each to continue
as aliens in a strange land and among unsympathetic people and
more or less hostile surroundings." Thus, rather than eliminate" a
problem we have cr~ated an additional one." Furthermore,
Mooney contended, history aptly demonstrated that tribal entities
were able to "preserve' their vitality and existence only in large
bodies." Since the Mescaleros were both a small and dispirited
people and "far behind the Chiricahuas in present advancement,"
their contact with the Fort Sill Apaches would prove severely
detrimental to this group. Were the Chiricahuas returned to
Arizona among related peoples, their prospects of survival would
be increased measurably. Should they be forced to remain in New
Mexico "with their small body and loss of faith in Government,"
they would be unable to "withstand the shock."46
In this vein, despite the heavy summer rains which promised
fairly successful crops,41 Jefferis reiterated his plea for funds with
which to stock Mescalero with cattle, inasmuch as the "returns
from crops produced on fifteen acres of land will be inadequate to
support the average Indian family. "48 Although initial indications
regarding endeavors to include the $200,000 reimbursable cattle
item in the fiscal 1915 Indian appropriation bill pointed toward
success, upon further inquiry Jefferis learned that this measure
failed to pass. 49 Instead, Jefferis would have to meet all of Mescalero's industrial needs out of a $75,000 lump sum appropriation
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allocated for this purpose. 50 This would allow the cattle business
to commence on a somewhat meager basis "with the result that
the first three years will be lean ones, so far as the Indians are concerned." Jefferis hoped the time would come when the Mescalero
Cattle Company herds numbered at least twelve thousand head in
order that "three full meals a day" for these Indians would be the
rule instead of the exception."51
Were ensuing developments any indication, Jefferis's hope was
not to be realized for some time to come. By mid-October 1914 the
Indian Office stopped rationing the Chiricahuas. Asa Daklugie,
who led the pro-Mescalero removal faction, believed his people
were not yet ready for such action. According to Daklugie, anywhere from three to five years of continued rationing was
necessary until the Fort Sill Apaches made an adequate beginning
in the cattle industry as well as improving their farmland. Besides,
as Daklugie viewed the situation, the government had a responsibility toward placing the Chiricahuas on an adequate plan of
economic self-sufficiency. 52
As if the matter of extinguished rations was not difficulty
enough, in mid-October, after six weeks without rain, a substantial portion of the Chiricahuas' oat crop was devastated by fire.
Shortly thereafter, numerous and heavy snowfalls punctuated the
remaining fall and early winter seasons. 53 This circumstance
made threshing of the Chiricahuas' crop nearly impossible.
Although several families managed to complete this task, by the
early spring of 1915 much of the crop was "still out in the fields."
Were the elements to force this situation to continue, the Chiricahuas would be prevented from planting their fields in time to salvage a harvest in late summer. 54
Another discouragement which presented itself was the matter
of housing. By the spring of 1915 housing construction for the
Chiricahuas located at White Tail had not been completed.
Homes which already had been erected were of poor quality. Incensed at yet another injustice inflicted upon the Fort Sill
Apaches, James O. Arthur, Reformed Church missionary to both
the Chiricahuas and Mescaleros, observed that "when the high
winds from the west" come "sweeping down the canyon, every
crack and knot-hole is discovered to admit the cooling breeze." A
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Above: Asa Daklugie, leader of the pro-Mescalero removal faction. Courtesy the
U.S. Army Artillery and Fort Sill Museum. Below: First housing at White Tail.
Courtesy the Smithsonian Institution.
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number of the houses were a "disgrace to the white men who are
responsible for their erection," Homes were "built upon wooden
posts for a foundation," and constructed "of lumber that went
from the standing tree to the carpenters' hands in a month's time,
so green that the sap oozed out with every nail driven into it."
When these dwellings finally dried out, floors, irside ceilings and
walls became surfeited with cracks such that "the knots drop out
of the boards," This situation made Arthur "warm under the collar every time" he visited the Chiricahuas' homes, viewed the
finished product and remembered that sufficient funds were appropriated "to have built a really respectable home under efficient
management. "55 Similar disgust with such circumstances caused
Asa Daklugie to lose confidence in Jefferis and call for a new
agent. 56
Jefferis's resignation on November IS, 1915 failed to have an
appreciable impact upon the Indians at Mescalero, So despondent
had some of the Fort Sill Apaches become that in early January
1916 several Chiricahuas were involved in a serious altercation
with Tularosa law enforcement authorities which resulted in
severe injuries. J. W, Prude, the trader at Mescalero who advised
General Senft of these incidents, strongly urged that former agent
James A, Carroll, in whom the Indians had confidence, be returned to this reservation without delay. Were this not to happen
then future episodes of a similar nature "would be a sweet morsel
in the mouth of, . . Senator Fall" so as to enable him to "criticize
those who were instrumental in getting the Fort Sill Apaches"
relocated ih New Mexico,57
Despite such timely warnings, Fall wasted no time in attempting to utilize this "sweet morse!" to good advantage. On January
5, J 916, he reintroduced legislation which would make Mescalero
a national park, Protesting the potential loss for these Indians of
their mineral, land, timber and hunting rights, Richard Henry
Harper, who initially established the Reformed Church's mission
at this reservation, asked whether such action was just. "Shall a
great Government like ours, in this enlightened age of the world,
deal thus with a helpless people?" Harper believed that "such
treatment of the weak by the strong in other days-and in some
countries today-would be called barbaric." Harper wondered
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whether it would be "less so if practiced by the people of the
United States."58 Also advocating defeat of Fall's endeavors in this
direction, William A. Light, the new agent at Mescalero, believed
the Indians' rights to this reservation should belong to them and
"their descendants 'as long as the sun shines and the water
runs.' "59
In this respect, Light especially emphasized the need to develop
more fully these Indians' cattle business. Light's predecessor
managed to purchase twelve hundred head of Herefords from the
$75,000 allocated to Mescalero for industrial purposes. At the
same time, the Chiricahuas purchased seven hundred head from
their individual monies. As a result of natural increase the herd
numbered 3160 head at the end of 1917 and was worth twenty
percent over the original purchase price. 60 Additional improvements at White Tail included storage sheds, cisterns, gardens, root
cellars and fencing, and, according to Light, "other indications of
general prosperity. "61
Manifestations of well-being to the contrary, Asa Daklugie and
Eugene Chihuahua, members of the Mescalero Business Committee, advised the Indian Office that "we just barely get along."
Referring to a portion of the Chiricahuas' individual Fort Sill cattle monies reinvested in Herefords at Mescalero, Daklugie and
Chihuahua said that "what money we had when we came to this
reservation has been spent for . . . good purpose." Since they
were in dire need of food and clothing, inasmuch as there was no
"means of employment or any regular work to be given us," these
individuals desired to know what became of the General Apache
Fund. After all, "this money we sweat and work hard for" they
earned it "honestly when [we] were prisoners of war." Daklugie
and Chihuahua believed that improvements on the reservation
ought to be funded by Congress. 62
Difficulties confronting the Chiricahuas were compounded due
to a severe drought experienced during the spring of 1918. Especially hard hit again was the Chiricahuas' oat crop which was to
bring in desperately needed cash for "supplies of cornmeal, coffee,
sugar, clothing, harness, various repairs and utensils of necessity."
Of approximately 608 acres planted, less than seventy acres were
productive. This led Light to describe their crops as failures and
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express the fear they would "have very little to live upon.
Daklugie and Chihuahua described the situation in stronger
terms. "At the present time some of our number are existing upon
less than white people feed to their dogs." Exhaustion of individual resources and credit at local stores did not improve matters. 63
Furthermore, the Chiricahuas were in need of barns, pumps for
a number of their wells, a blacksmith to repair their implements, a
traction engine to thresh their oats and hospital facilities. Houses
erected only several years earlier were already in poor condition.
Indeed, by the end of 1918, houses had yet to be erected for several
Chiricahua families. Small wonder that Daklugie and Chihuahua
eXlJressed the sentiment that "we have been neglected and some of
the promises made by Government officials when we were liberated and placed on this reservation have not been kept. "64
Because these and similar conditions not only greatly disheartened the Chiricahuas 65 but also their Mescalero brethren, Asa
Daklugie and his Mescalero counterparts launched a vigorous
campaign which repeatedly urged Major General Scott, who had
just completed his term as Chief of Staff, to "please ask Congress
to give us its value and hold the timber so we can get homes and
stock our range; we need their help as we are a poor people
now. "66 Daklugie's entreaties eventually prompted Scott personally to ascertain conditions at Mescalero in his new capacity as a
member of the Board of Indian Commissioners. 67 Because the Chiricahuas were promised "that they would be put in as good an
economic condition as when they were at Fort Sill," said Scott,
these Indians came to Mescalero in 1913 "full of courage and
hope." Inasmuch as this guarantee remained unfulfilled, the Fort
Sill Apaches not only became greatl" discouraged over their
future at this reservation, but also had retrograded since coming
under Interior's jurisdiction. Relative to the proposed reimbursable cattle appropriation, which monies were designed to be
allocated on the basis of Mescalero's timber resources as security,
Scott maintained that "had action been taken at once these Indians would be on their feet."68 While at Mescalero, Scott
gathered the Chiricahuas together and "said 'I am sorry. I am
responsible for your people moving here.''' If any wished to
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return to Oklahoma, " 'I'll be glad to take you back.' " Although
several did return to Oklahoma, most "felt themselves committed
and said they would try to begin life anew at Mescalero."69
Ernest Stecker, who became the new agent at Mescalero in July
1919, was the major force behind the Chiricahuas' renewed efforts toward a brighter future. Stecker, who was quite familiar to
these Indians when they were at Fort Sill while he was Anadarko
Agency superintendent for the Kiowas and Comanches, boldly
produced a plan of economic development for the entire reservation. This project envisioned the sale of a minimum of 170,000,000 feet of timber valued at $500,000, the funds to be made
available on a reimbursable basis. At least half of these monies
would be invested so as to increase the cattle herd to six thousand
head. There would ensue a minimum yearly sale of 4500 yearlings
yielding an annual income of approximately $180,000. 70
Yet, despite Stecker's efforts to attain this goal, there passed
another three years before any positive action was obtained on this
matter. Almost immediately Stecker's plan was confronted with
severe political opposition. In turn, this caused the Indian Office
to be more than reluctant in expressing its support for Stecker's
proposal-so much so that the agent found himself constrained, in
the course of urging support for his program, to advise General
Scott that he had "no confidence in Mr. Sells." Fortunately, Scott
succeeded in his attempts at pressuring Interior to sign the
necessary timber confract. By the end of 1920, one battle remained to be won as Congress had yet to allocate the reimbursable
funding for this project. 71
Yet opposition forces in Congress also could claim jl partial victory. When the funding request for Stecker's proposal reached
Congress on January 7, 1921, only $250,000 in reimbursable
funds was solicited. 72 Despite Scott's persistent pressure to have
these monies made available, due to a short congressional session
this appropriation failed to pass. 73 "After many years of disappointment," said Roger Toclanny and Charles Martine, the Chiricahua members of the Mescalero Indian Business Committee, "it
now seems as though our wish for better living conditions is to be
realized." They, as well as other members of this organization,
decided to pressure government officials in order to ensure that
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such prospects might be fully realized. As such, they constantly
pleaded with Scott not to relax his vigilance on this issue. 74
Indeed, according to Fred C. Morgan; the newly arrived agent
at Mescalero, "unless funds are available from some source either
to give them work or to set them on their feet in the stock business
I anticipate that there will be many discouraged and hungry Indians before the problem is finally worked out." Otherwise, said
Morgan, he saw "very little hope of getting these Indians on their
feet at an early date."75 Fortunately, the agitation exercised on
behalf of these Indians began to produce favorable results. By May
1922 legislation had been formulated for a $250,000 reimbursable appropriation designed "for the purpose of promoting
civilization and self-support among the Indians of the Mescalero
Reservation in New Mexico."76 In the course of conference nego'tiations, funding for this item was pared down to $75,000. Even
so, during the first quarter of 1923, mainly due to the relentless efforts expended by Scott in support of both the Chiricahuas and
Mescaleros, this measure became law. 77
With this development, Sam Kenoi poignantly expressed these
Indians' appreciation for Scott's endeavors on this issue. "Dear
General accept our sincere thanks. There has," said Kenoi, "been
much really great suffering here" among the Chiricahuas and
Mescaleros. "With some of this appropriation available for immediate relief our suffering oU'ght soon to be at an end." Kenai
promised that, "in our better times, when we are able to have at
least the necessities of life," each "Indian will think of General
Scott through whose efforts the much needed relief has come."
Kenai again hoped that Scott would accept the heartfelt gratitude
of "these Apaches at Mescalero whom you have so often helped in
a fatherly way. . . ."78
Thus, after a ten-year period of gross 'neglect by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, a small beginning was made toward fulfilling the
promises made to the Chiricahuas in 1913 when they left Fort Sill
for Mescalero. As matters stood, the $ 75,000 reimbursable appropriation would only provide for a portion of the much needed cat, tIe with which to stock the reservation. They continued to be in
need of better housing, and "barns and sheds for. . . their stock
and farming utensils," for which purpose funds had to come from
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some other source since the "Indians are without funds to do this
work. "79 Years would pass before the Chiricahuas again experienced anything close to the degree of prosperity they attained at
Fort Sill. Had the Indian Office been not only less concerned with
political expedience regarding Fall's national park scheme, but
also more willing to place the Chiricahuas on a plane of economic
self-sufficiency by making available to them the General Apache
Fund and pressing Congress for the reimbursable cattle appropriation at the very least, these Indians would not have been plunged
into destitution. Had their rations not been summarily cut off, the
Fort Sill Apaches, who certainly deserved better treatment, would
not have been forced to starve. As such, the economic distress experienced by the former Chiricahua Apache prisoners of war is illustrative of an outrage perpetrated upon a people whose saga was
already surfeited with abundant injustices.
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THE TROUBLE WITH TEXANS: MANUEL ALVAREZ
AND THE 1841 "INVASION"

THOMAS ESTEBAN CHAVEZ

IN

1841 an army of about 320 men, fourteen wagons, and one
howitzer left Austin, Texas, for Santa Fe, New Mexico. Delayed at
the start, the expedition became lost en route and subsequently ran
out of food with the result that all were famished when they
entered New Mexico. Little did they know of the commotion they
would cause in that Mexican department. They were also oblivious to the trouble they would bring to the United States Consul
Manuel Alvarez, Spanish merchant and ex-trapper, who was stationed there primarily as an overseer of the trade along the Santa
Fe Trail. Texan invasion of New Mexico created real 'problems for
Alvarez. As representative for American citizens, he was already
somewhat alienated from the Mexican population, Arrival of the
expedition confirmed the New Me~:ican fears of Texas, and seemed
also to implicate all Anglo-Americans in New Mexico in a conspiracy to undermine the Mexican government.
Although Texas had claimed its independence in 1836, the Mexican government refused to recognize it, considering herself at
war with a rebellious department. Native New Mexicans saw the
approaching Texans as an extension of the war. The question of
whether or not Mirabeau Lamar, the president of Texas, or his
commander, Major General Hugh McLeod, really intended to
force their claims of an extended Texas is moot since the New
Mexico population was certain they were and rumor quickly
spread that all the Americans were in sympathy with the Texas
cause. Yet this probably was not true with the majority of extranjeros.
0028-6206/78/0400-0133$1.20/0
©Regents, University of New Mexico

134

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW 53:2 1978

A motive for the expedition came from innocent activities of
American merchants trading with New Mexico. Especially important was a successful 1839 caravan which Josiah Gregg had taken
to Santa Fe from Arkansas. This had attracted Lamar's attention
and the Texas president reasoned that his new government would
benefit considerably from Santa Fe trade via a southern route. To
that end, in early 1841 Lamar appointed William Dryden commissioner to New Mexico. l However, Dryden had run afoul of
New Mexico Governor Manuel Armijo over the murder of a man
named Alexander Daley near the placer mines southwest of Santa
Fe. Because of Armijo's lax treatment of the culprits, Dryden led
an angry protest which brought a nonviolent confrontation with
the Mexican militia. 2 The result was that Dryden had very little or
no respect for the Mexican people.
Other Americans, such as Thomas Rowland, William Workman
and Charles Bent, were also accused of being Texas agents. 3 Rowland denied such accusations but his house in San Miguel was
ransacked anyway and he subsequently sought restitution of one
thousand dollars in damages through Consul Alvarez. 4 Charles
Bent and William Workman were accused of similar complicity
by Juan B. Vigil, a lawyer in Taos. This accusation incensed both
merchants and they resorted to frontier-style justice. Since the
government had recently enacted decrees for deporting extranjeros, the two men had little trust in Mexican law. Instead they immediately found their accuser and demanded he prove his
charges. Apparently Vigil's answer was not sufficient, for
Workman started beating him, first with a whip and then with his
fists, until Bent called him off. 5 As Bent explained, such violence
was necessary because Vigil expected it. Bent added he "would
rather wipe [sic] a man . . . then [sic] have him punished ten times
by the law."6 Bent advised Alvarez of the incident, and, when
later arrested for it, asked the consul to solicit the governor's aid.
"You will recollect the promises [of gunpowder] I told you that
had been made to one in Santa Fe. Now they will be tested."
Alvarez was also to tell the governor that he would get the
powder Bent had promised. 7 The local judge suspended the case,
confining Bent to his house, and the next day Bent sent Armijo, via
Alvarez, one keg of powder and ten kegs of coffee. The consul
received a set of seven volumes of history for his efforts. 8 Bent was
then released.
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But this did not stop the source of the probl'em, for Vigil continued to accuse other Anglo-Americans; he even threatened the
local judge. In March 1841 Bent and four men planned to give
Vigil a more severe beating, but the barking of dogs allowed the
intended victim to make a hasty retreat. He then took refuge in
Cordova where he asked for an armed escort out of the valley. A
few more scares, thought Bent, and the problem would be solved. 9
Others, however, were not convinced. Fearing for their families'
lives, Workman and some friends decided that they would be better off elsewhere. Dryden already had fled because local authorities had found a letter addressed to him from a member of the
Texas army.IO As early as January 1841, the extranjeros had
known of the Texans' plans, and possible effects of the proposed
Texan visit had them worried. II
The situation worsened for the extranjeros when Governor Armijo received definite word that the Texans were getting close. On
September 11, Comanche Indians reported their position and four
days later two deserters from the Texan expedition arrived in
Santa Fe. Alvarez got wind of a rumor that the deserters had
named some prominent New Mexican extranjeros as spies for the
expedition. 12 Such rumors upset the public and they confirmed
Alvarez's worst fears. At one point the local militia had to disperse
a mob in the Santa Fe plaza. As U.S. consul, Alvarez was the only
official to whom the Americans could turn. He hoped his previous
diplomatic forays with Armijo would now serve him in good
stead. Alvarez would now have to draw on his experience since
protection of human life was the issue at stake. As the Texans approached, Armijo became more impatient. 13 Matters came to a
head in late September of 1841.
Immediately after the initial Comanche reports, Alvarez had a
personal conference with Armijo to express his concern for the
Americans' safety. The consul officially petitioned that all
alcaldes and jueces de paz of towns in which foreigners resided be
ordered to respect foreigners' persons and property. This the
Governor verbally promised, and Alvarez was satisfied with the
government's action. 14 He was pleased that the governor had informed him of the Texan approach and had assured him that the
necessary precautions would be taken. Alvarez responded that
"this proposition appeared to me just and to inform me of it [was]
kind, for which I am infinitely gratified."ls An official replied on

136

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW 53:2 1978

behalf of the governor that Alvarez could be assured of the governor's word. He promised all the protection required in conformity
with the treaties between the two countries. However, the governor offered protection only on the condition that the foreigners
give no aid to the Texans. 16 The next day, when the two deserters
arrived, Alvarez received information that some Americans had
been insulted by local Mexicans. l ) This knowledge, plus mounting
excitement over arrival of the deserters, caused him to repeat his
previous requests. IS He did not blame the governor for the incidents, for he realized Armijo could not be responsible for everything. Alvarez received a conciliatory reply but other worried
American citizens drafted a letter to Secretary of State Daniel
Webster expressing fears of robbery and murder. 19
These fears were soon realized. A few minutes after Armijo and
his army marched out of Santa Fe, the governor's nephew, Ensign
Don Thomas Martin, and a friend, Sergeant Pablo Dominguez,
galloped into the plaza. They took a Texan prisoner out of jail
and, with a crowd of locals, entered Alvarez's office in an apparent attempt to harass the consul. Alvarez was convinced that
their goal was assassination. Martin got to Alvarez first and, just
as he was "about to master him,"20 Dominguez came to Martin's
aid. Meanwhile the mob followed, shouting, "saquenlo afuera!
[sic] matenlo [sic]!"-drag him outi Kill him!"21 Alvarez received a
knife thrust in the face. Had not Armijo's Secretary, Guadalupe
Miranda, ridden up and dispersed the mob, Martin would have
killed the consul. While there is no evidence that Governor Armijo
had prior knowledge of the incident, it evidently did not upset
him. Martin and Dominguez soon received military promotions,
while the subsequent treatment accorded Alvarez was, at best, unpleasant. 22 The episode created a martyr's reputation for Alvarez,
and widespread fame. Virtually anyone who mentioned him in
subsequent years made some reference to this brutal treatment. 23
During the next few days, consul and Mexican government petitioned each other. Alvarez expressed concern about both intentions of the Texans and safety of American citizens. In an official
capacity, he had to deal with the Texans since their country had
been recognized by the United States. To this end he sought permission to meet with the expedition's leaders, a request which
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made the Governor suspicious. 24 Could the American consul be
seeking to inform the Texans of something? Another of the myriad
of requests for assurance that the Americans be protected led to a
disgruntled reply from the governor on September 22, 1841.
When Alvarez explained that he felt it his duty to-see the approaching Texans, Armijo withdrew his official recognition of the
consuJ.25 From the Governor's viewpoint, this eliminated any need
for Alvarez to leave town. He no longer had any official capacity,
and meanwhile the Governor issued a circular that prohibited all
travel in the direction from which the Texans were coming. 26 This
would keep Alvarez and others in Santa Fe, preventing them from
providing any information to the Texans. Alvarez refused the governor's subsequent offer to join the Mexican camp.27
Meanwhile, some of the Americans had had enough and met secretly at Abiquiu to leave for California. In December· the
Rowland-Workman party of twenty-three Anglos and three Mexicans reached their destination. 28 All were acquaintances of
Alvarez, and one of them even had asked him to bribe an official,
Don Agustin Duran, for a passport. 29 Many of these people continued to correspond with Alvarez, thus establishing one of the
earliest New Mexico-California connections which later developed
into profitable business operations, especially in sheep. Alvarez
even received reports from ex-New Mexicans on the progress of the
Mexican war in California. His efforts on their behalf were not
overlooked. As his friend who needed the passport wrote, "and
now farwell [sic] to you my very much respected friend. I shall
often think of you and your very great exertions on my behalf both
as a friend and in your official capacity as American Consul."30
The California-bound party vS'as able to slip away unnoticed
since all attention centered on the San Miguel area, southeast of
Santa Fe. There, the first of the hated Texans struggled into view.
Actually, however, most of New Mexican anxiety was in vain. The
Texans' ill-planned, ill-equipped, and ill-directed journey through
the plains, where Indians harassed them constantly, was far more
discouraging than the ragamuffin militia they met. A little trickery, such as unkept promises of good treatment, was enough to
make the invaders give up their arms. The prisoners were kept
under guard at San Miguel until Armijo, dressed in his finest uni-
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form, could address them. Then they were forced onto a treacherous march to El Paso where eventually they received better treatment. Another victory was thus added to the legend of Armijo's
military prowess-since his rise to power in 1837, he claimed to
have saved Mexico's northern department twice within four years,
and because of the distance between Santa Fe and Mexico City,
appearances often mattered as much as reality.
Even as the news of the captive Texans came in, the harried
Alvarez scarcely had time to tend to his wounds, much less complain about American rights. Several Americans, and Thomas
Falconer, an English citizen, were among the prisoners. More astonishing was the discovery of a native Mexican with the invaders.
He was Antonio Navarro, an ex-senator in the Mexican government. 31 One of the Americans was George Wilkins Kendall, editor
of the New Orleans Picayune. He set off to Santa Fe strictly as a
journalist but unfortunately he had used the Texan expedition as a
means to get there. Even though he and Falconer had proper
passports, Governor Armijo refused to act, insisting that they remain prisoners with the rest. Undaunted by his close scrape with
death, Alvarez sought Kendall's release. Observing the governor's belligerence, Alvarez protested that the incarceration of
American citizens among the Texans was a disgrace to the United
States government. 32 Alvarez then met with Charles Bent and
James Magoffin, a longtime trader on the trail, to discuss extralegal means of securing Kendall's release. Together they raised
three thousand dollars. They offered this to Armijo for the release
of the American editor and the Mexican, Navarro, "to shew [sic]
that we were not altogether part.ial to the Americans. "33 Armijo
rejected the offer, and Kendall, tNavarro, and Falconer marched
with the rest of the prisoners to Mexico City.
Governor Armijo feared that other Texans, possibly a second
force, might be heading toward Santa Fe. Consequently he extended his order forbidding travel toward the southeast. This
prohibition caused a critical delay in granting Alvarez a passport
for the United States, resulting in a wait of nearly a month. 34 The
consul was anxious to get to the States for he had a long list of
complaints for which the American government could justifiably
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demand reparations. Foremost was the fact that the United States
consul _had been physically abused and robbed. This was far more
blatant than any previous incident. Any delay in granting him a
passport only served to prove his point, especially since the winter
season was fast approaching.
On September 28, the governor reaffirmed his earlier decree on
travel and refused Alvarez's petition to rescind the order. 35 A few
days later Alvarez received an answer to another of his petitions.
It stated that neither he nor any other foreigner would be allowed
to leave New Mexico. 36 Within a week after the Texans arrived
Alvarez had been ready to leave, but Armijo allowed the unrecognized consul to wait impatiently for over a month. It was not until
October 25, 1841, presumably when Armijo became convinced
that no new Texan threat was developing, that Alvarez and fifteen
Americans received their passports. 37
Fearing that the governor might change his mind, the Alvarez
party left Santa Fe the next day.38 They bypassed Bent's Fort on
the upper Arkansas River and took the hazardous Cimarron Cutoff. The party then divided, five members detouring down the Arkansas River and four others going ahead.
Alvarez took a risk crossing the plains in late October. Snows
fell on the small party near Council Grove at Cotton Wood Creek.
They were stopped in three feet of snow and found themselves
unable to keep a fire going. There they suffered their first casualty
when John Richmire, one of the four men who had gone ahead,
froze to death four miles from camp.39 By then, however, the main
body had caught up with the other three. Two were so badly
frozen and sick that Alvarez decided to leave them with one
healthy person while the rest struck out for aid from Missouri settlements. They made it to Independence on December 15, and by
the 17th help had worked its way back to Council Grove. Unfortuna tely, a second man died before the rescuers arrived. 40 Not
one of the original Alvarez party escaped frostbite. Some of the
survivors suffered severely, and only Alvarez's insistence that
everyone keep moving saved the remainder. 41
In St. Louis, the consul presented to the federal government his
losses totalling $8,210. The tally proved him to be something
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more than a poor man. He claimed a loss of two r.iding horses, one
buffalo horse, "two Jacks of superior size and breed," thirty-six
mules, one gun and other utensils, as well as personal baggage. 42
Alvarez was careful to bring all his official correspondence with
him. Before leaving Santa Fe he collected everything and after his
safe arrival in Missouri, he wrote to Daniel Webster. He informed
the Secretary of State of his arrival and of his plans to "proceed to
the seat of government" to relate the injuries suffered by United
States citizens in New Mexico. Alvarez included a narrative
"nearly agreeing with the facts" for the department's inspection.
A statement signed by American residents of New Mexico would
be presented at a personal interview. Alvarez delayed the meeting
until "after some repose which is necessary to recruit my health
impaired by a troublesome journey."4J However, a narrative, petition, and personal interview would not suffice. Webster had no
way to predict what the consul had in store for him. The narrative
was a thirty-two page memorial, meticulously footnoted, with the
original documents attached. Those letters written in Spanish
were accompanied by English translations. In all, he included
over sixty letters substantiating the text of the memorial. 44 Upon
Alvarez's request, the State Department returned the original letters in exchange for his own hand-written copies. 45 The impressive
memorial formed only one part of his statement, since Alvarez
also wanted to remonstrate to Congress. He collected letters of introduction, and hoped to meet the Speaker of the House, John
White, or even persuade someone to use his "aid and influence
with Mr. Clay and other friends. "46
By February, 1842, Alvarez was in Washington, and asked
Webster what the State Department planned to do about the incidents contained within the memorial. 47 The department replied
that Waddy Thompson, recently appointed minister to Mexico,
would be instructed personally "to make proper representations to
that government. "48
A couple of weeks later, Alvarez entered a second petition on his
own behalf. He reiterated the attempt on his life and emphasized
the outrage by claiming that even though the Mexican government had initially recognized him as the United States consul, the
local Mexican authorities did nothing by way of reparations or
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apologies. For this he asked for an indemnity of $2,500. For payment for the "arbitrary detention" which caused the deaths of two
men, he asked $2,000 more. Alvarez argued that his "arrest" from
September 16 to October 25 was worth $5,000. Finally, he
wanted $8,200 for his losses on the trail. 49 This amazing petition
seemed not to faze Webster. His prompt reply the next day
touched on the question of Alvarez's proper citizenship, a question
from which the consul was allowed to withdraw. 50 Alvarez's petition received a much less cordial reception than the memorial presented on behalf of the American residents. In a succinct and brisk
iocument, Webster told Alvarez that his lack of U.S. citizenship
prevented the United States from seeking reparations from the
Mexican government on his behalf. Because he was never granted
an exequatur, Webster concluded, "there cannot, for the present
at least, be anything done in your behalf."51
As a result of this, Alvarez decided he should apply for U.S.
citizenship. On April 9, 1842, in the St. Louis Court of Common
Pleas, he became a United States citizen. 52 There were two obvious
reasons for this: first, Governor Armijo had always hesitated in
answering his request for personal protection because the consul
harl been a Mexican citizen;53 second, Webster had reasoned that
the United States could do nothing because Alvarez was not an
American citizen. 54 Through naturalization, the consul felt he
would eliminate such problems in the future.
Alvarez and his two witnesses, Theodore Papin and Pascaul L.
Cerri, two old fur trapper friends, had to bend the facts to gain the
coveted citizenship for him. They certified that Alvarez had resided in the United States for "at least five years, and in the State
of Missouri at least one year, immediately preceding this application." This, of course-e was untrue. It took almost a month before
Alvarez worded a two-sentence letter to inform Webster of his
naturalization and let him know "I leave [for Santa Fe] tomorroW."55 It is clear he was bitter at the lack of appreciation he
received for his consular efforts.
The people on whose behalf Alvarez risked his life were equally
disgusted with Webster. George W. Kendall and Josiah Gregg
drew a clear portrait of Alvarez's heroism in their respective
works Narrative of the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition and Commerce
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of the Prairies, in which they wrote that though Alvarez had
risked his life for his countrymen and only narrowly escaped, the
United States government did nothing in his behalf. 56
The intense mistrust and constant misunderstanding which
characterized relations between Alvarez and the New Mexican
government, complicated by the intervention of Texas, showed
clearly the tensions that existed among cultures that crossed in the
SQuthwest. Such economic and political conflict, some innocent,
some intentioned, provided additional fuel for the fire that broke
out at the end of the decade. In such an environment, fear of open
warfare could become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Manuel Alvarez
personified the fragmentation which plagued New Mexico in the
mid-nineteenth century, as a region belonging to Mexico, but
largely dependent economically on the United States, changed
into a part of the United States still tied culturally to Mexico.
Those crosscurrents have never disappeared from life in the Rio
Grande basin.
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REVOLUTION AND CONFUSION:
THE PECULIAR CASE OF
JOSE INES' SALAZAR
RALPH H. VIGIL

. "If to thy window comes Porfirio Diaz,
Give him for charity cold tortillas;
If to thy window comes Gener?l Huerta,
Spit in his face and slam the door.
If to thy window comes Inez Salazar,
Lock your trunks so he can't steal;
If to thy window comes Maclovio Herrera,
Give him di;'ner and put the cloth on the table.
If to thy window. . . ."
The demented sergeant's song in Glendon Swarthout's
They Came to Cordura (New York, 1958).

JOSE INES SALAZAR, Mexican rebel and alleged political chameleon, has not attracted a biographer and is seldom mentioned in
the historiography of the Mexican Revolution. In addition, the
case of the United States of America, plaintiff, versus Jose Ines
Salazar, defendant, is practically an unknown episode in Southwestern history. Because little attention has been given this prominent military leader who played a major role in events prior to and
during the Mexican Revolution, this essay attempts to place
Salazar within the broader context of U.S.-Mexico Borderlands
history. Not only was General Salazar one of the most spectacular
characters of the bloody and chaotic first decade that inaugurated
the Mexican Revolution, but his flight to the United States in 1914
began a succession of events that culminated in the criminal trial
of Elfego Baca, Manuel U. Vigil, and other New Mexico public officials for conspiracy against the federal government: The trial
and its circumstances join Mexican revolutionary events with an
episode in New Mexico's recent past that ruined several political
0028-6206/78/0400-0145$2.60/0
©Regents, University of New Mexico
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careers. Folk hero Elfego Baca appears to have survived the trial
with an en.hanced reputation, but Manuel U. Vigil's political
career was destroyed. Had Salazar remained in Mexico, Vigil
would never have been indicted for conspiracy and might have
eventually occupied the senate seat vacated when Senator Bronson
Cutting unexpectedly met his death in an airplane crash in 1935.
When Porfirio Diaz had himself reelected president of Mexico
for the sixth consecutive time in 1910, Jose Ines Salazar joined the
forces of Francisco 1. Madero and declared for effective suffrage
and the end of the Porfjrian regime. But the "quiet, fearless, and
dangerous" guerrilla, whose enormous stature was balanced by
the great breadth of his shoulders, was not a newcomer to revolutionary circles. 1 Salazar was considered a revolutionary by the
Diaz regime long before the Plan of San Luis Potosi and the armed
revolt led by the poet and anarchist Praxedis Guerrero and
Salazar in Casas Grandes, Chihuahua, in late 1910. 2
As a member of the Partido Liberal Mexicano affiliate, the
Union Liberal Humanidad, Salazar was involved in the strike by
Mexican laborers in 1906 against the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, put down by Arizona Rangers plus American volunteers and Mexican troopS.3 Two years later the Mexican consul
in El Paso received word that Salazar and his brother Angel had
been living in Metcalf, Arizona. Salazar had left Metcalf for Casas
Grandes, had eluded capture on Mexican soil, and had escaped to
Bisbee or its environs. Agents of the Mexican government had
been told to look for Salazar, and it was noted that he and other
rebels headed by Praxedis Guerrero had made Metcalf, Clifton,
and Morenci "true centers of revolutionary activity" where plans
had been brewed for attacks that had taken place on frontier Mexican settlements. 4 In early 1909 it was reported that arms and ammunition had been purchased in the United States and brought
into Mexico by Jose Ines Salazar and Pascual Orozco. 5
It appears that Salazar, the owner of a small ranch in Mexico,
had lived in both the United States and Mexico since the early part
of the century. In 1914 various character witnesses (one a former
sheriff of Dona Ana County, New Mexico) stated that he had
worked as a miner in Morenci, Arizona, as early as 1903. Prior to
the Madero revolt he may have worked as a section hand on the
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railroad in New Mexico, and as a straw boss in Mexico. He had
also been a miner at Lordsburg, New Mexico, and had worked as a
miner and mining contractor in the Organ mining district, about
twelve miles from Las Cruces, New Mexico. After 1910, Salazar, a
robust figure who stood more than six feet in his laced boots,
became a military commander who liked to wear big Stetson hats
and heavy suits while in the field. He was an eloquent speaker and
was reputed to hold his audiences spellbound when he spoke of
social reform, economic problems, and political affairs. Those
who knew him in these years described him as a man of "good
character, industrious, and a law abiding citizen whose character
could not be questioned."6 Not all portrayals of Salazar's character were as complimentary.
Enrique Flores Mag6n, for one, claimed that in the attack on
Palomas, Chihuahua, in 1908, he, Praxedis Guerrero, and seven
other revolutionaries, including Salazar, were forced to retreat
into the desert on June 30. The band's destination was Casas
Grandes and their guide was Salazar. Two days after leaving
Palomas, "Jose Ines Salazar became afraid and abandoned us in
the middle of the desert, unknown by us. At a later date we
learned that he had fled and took refuge in an abandoned mine,
where one of his brothers [had] worked."7 Conrado Gimeno, a
rebel captain in Chihuahua who became disenchanted with Pascual Orozco and the "canalla roja" and fled to EI Paso in April,
1912, claimed that Salazar was well known by the Mexicans who
habitually resided in that city. Nearly all of them had been
bothered by his demands for money, so that he might satiate his
hunger during the long periods of time he had spent in that city as
a tramp. Gimeno stated that at other times Salazar had worked as
a bootblack, stonecutter, or miner, but observed that "without
any political idea and incapable of forming one, he has always inclined to magonismo, whose principles of social distribution he
presently observes, paying to himself in the most reformist, liberal
and just manner possible the products of the 'loans' with which he
destroys the commerce of the settlements who have the misfortune
to receive a visit from him."8
Although the El Paso Morning Times claimed that Salazar's
"military genius was conspicuous by his absence," he distin-
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guished himself in. the battles that led to the triumph of el lnmaculado Francisco I. Madero. Against Madero's wishes, Pascual
Orozco, Jose Ine's Salazar, Pancho Villa, and other fire-eaters
seized Ciudad Juarez on May 10, 1911. The success of the Antireelectionists was assured by this victory, but antagonism was
already evident between members of the Mexican Liberal Party
and Madero. Because of differences that had arisen between
Madero and the Liberals, Salazar and other PLM members who
adhered to (he Anti-reelectionists asked for their discharges;
should Madero not honor their request "we shall do it ourselves
and consider you more of a tyrant than Diaz himself." Madero
replied that he had arrested Liberal party commanders and disarmed their troops because he had learned of their attempts to
recruit the largest number of soldiers possible from his ranks and
their plans to leave his side. Moreover, several of the PLM commanders had raised the red banner of "Land and Liberty" in
Chihuahua, and the wearing of the "distinctive red" by the
Liberals, more accurately called Socialists, was considered an act
of rebellion against Madero's government. 9
When in November, 1911, a counterrevolution headed by Emilio Vazquez Gomez began, Salazar declared for agrarian reform
and joined the rebels. In early 1912 a barracks revolt took place in
Juarez and General Salazar with 400 soldiers occupied the city.
Meanwhile, Salazar and other irregular officers in revolt against
Madero formally requested Pascual Orozco to become "Caudillo
and General-in-Chief of the Ejercito Libertador." In March
Orozco accepted the command of the rebel army and he, Salazar,
and other rebel generals vowed to fight for the triumph of the
ideals of the Plan of San Luis Potosi, reformed in Tacubaya and in
accordance with the pertinent part of the Plan of Ayala. Francisco
I. Madero was declared the "Pharisee of Democracy" and the
"Iscariot of the fatherland" and the insurrection labeled Orozquista began. 1o
After Orozco declared against the federal government and
battled Pancho Villa for Chihuahua City, Salazar and other
Liberals gave the new revolution some social character when they
moved to Nombre de Dios from Juarez and waved the banner of
"Reform, Liberty, and Justice." Salazar then won the important
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Left to right: Elfego Baca, Jose Ines Salazar, and J. B. McGuinnes, Baca's
secretary, taken in El Paso prior to the removal of Salazar to Albuquerque for
trial. Courtesy of George Fitzpatrick.
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battle of Santa Rosalia and shortly thereafter defeated Pancho
V ill a in the battle for Hidalgo del Parra!' II
Following the occupation of Parral on March 20, 1912, General
Salazar came to the attention of the United States Senate when
Thomas A. J. Fountain, an American citizen born in Mesilla,
Dona Ana County, New Mexico, was executed after being courtmartialed. At his courtmartial Fountain admitted that he was a
soldier connected with Francisco Villa's command and had operated a machine gun in the battle for Parra!' Meanwhile, Mr. Long,
the consular agent at Parral, was informed that Fountain was an
American citizen, and communicated this information to Marion
Letcher, the American consul at Chihuahua City. Letcher took the
matter up with higher authorities and was told that he should prevent Fountain's execution. On April 9, 1912, Long met with
General Salazar and informed him of "the order of the United
States Government. . . that he should not murder this American
citizen who had been simply caught under arms or in the uniform
of the Federal Government of Mexico." The protest was received
ungraciously and at five 0' clock the next morning Thomas Fountain "was placed with his face against an adobe wall and shot to
death."12
In the same month that Fountain was executed, the Madero government launched a major offensive against Orozco's Colorados.
The rebels were defeated at Conejos, Rellano, Canyon of BdChimba, and Chihuahua City. Orozco's red flaggers then retired to
Casas Grandes and there caused the Mormons trouble.
In July, 1912, General Salazar ordered the Mormon colonists of
northwestern Chihuahua to surrender all their firearms and ammunition to the rebels. In return for a promise of safe conduct for
the Mormon women and children to the border and in order to
avoid a house to house search, Junius Romney, the Mormon president of the Juarez stake, complied with the order. Mormon guns
were delivered at Colonia Juarez and Colonia Dublan, and the exodus of Mormon women and children began. When some 500 of
the exiles reached £1 Paso they were given shelter in an abandoned
lumber shed. They remained in £1 Paso until early 1913. 13
The capture of Juarez by Federal troops in August, 1912, forced
the rebels to resort to guerrilla warfare. In September Pascual
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Orozco managed to defeat Federal troops at Ojinaga "and the
town served the rebels as a capital until January, 1913." Orozco
in this period briefly attempted to enlist support for the rebel cause
in the United States, but early December saw his return to Chihuahua to coordinate guerrilla efforts by Jose Ines Salazar and
other rebelleaders. 14
In February, 1913, a coup against Madero was successful and
he was deposed and assassinated. Victoriano Huerta then assumed
the provisional presidency of the nation, and an anti-Huerta movement began to be organized by Venustiano Carranza, Alvaro
Obregon, and Pancho Villa. At the same time Emilio Vazquez
Gomez, exiled in the United States following his anti-Madero
rebellion in 1912, crossed the border and began to act as president
of Mexico from Palomas, Chihuahua. Vazquez Gomez attempted
to rally the anti-Huerta forces behind him and even communicated with the Department of State of the United States, asking that his government be recognized. His secretary of war was
Jose Ines Salazar.t s
Salazar's alliance with Vazquez Gomez was brief, for in
November, 1914, both Pascual Orozco and Salazar were acting as
military commanders for General Salvador R. Mercado, Huerta's
military governor in Chihuahua. On November 15 Pancho Villa
forced the surrender of the Federal garrison in Juarez, and after
much indecision Mercado allowed General Salazar to try to retake
the city. At Tierra Blanca, some twenty miles from El Paso, Salazar's troops were repulsed on November 25, and more than a
thousand of his men were killed, wounded, or captured. General
Mercado then ordered the evacuation of Chihuahua City and a
retreat to Ojinaga. "Orozco and Salazar were ordered to Ojinaga
to join the main body of Federal troops." 16
In late December "four infantry brigades, supported by artillery
and machine-gun batteries" attacked Mercado's troops at Ojinaga. On January 1, 1914, these forces were joined by those under
Constitutionalist generals Panfilo Natera and Toribio Ortega.
Because seven days of savage assaults failed to capture the city,
Villa decided to take personal command of the Constitutionalist
army. When Ojinaga fell to Villa on January 10, General Mercado and some 4,000 soldiers and their families in Chihuahua fled

152

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW 53:2 1978

Mexico for the United States. Salazar was one of the defeated officers who managed to escape into Texas. 17
After entering the United States, Salazar was arrested at Sanderson, Texas, and taken into custody. On March 9, 1914, Senator
Lodge asked Senator Fall where Salazar was. Mr. Fall replied:
"He is eating three square meals a day on this side of the river at
Fort Bliss, near El Paso, Texas, protected by American soldiers.
Meals are being furnished and paid for by the taxpayers of this
Government for something over 4,000 of the Mexicans who came
across the river at Ojinaga and other places at a cost to this
Government, I have seen it stated, of $2,000 a day."18
Following his arrest on January 17, 1914, the United States
Commissioner at Marfa, Texas, charged Salazar with violation of
Section 37 of the Penal Code of the United States. On May 14 he
was acquitted of conspiring to smuggle munitions of war over the
border in the United States District Court at Santa Fe, New Mexico, but was immediately again taken into custody by military
authorities and taken to Fort Wingate, near Gallup, New Mexico,
for violation of neutrality laws entered into by the United States
and Mexico at the Hague Convention and ratified on November
27,1909. 19
At Fort Wingate General Salazar met Elfego Baca, General
Huerta's American representative. According to Kyle S. Crichton,
whose life of Elfego Baca is a strange mixture of fact, fantasy, and
pictorial imagination, Baca "received $25,000 and expense
money amounting to $3,500" to defend and secure the release of
Salazar. 20 The sums of money paid Baca mayor may not be correct, but what is true is that Huerta needed Salazar in Mexico to
help in the major counteroffensive he planned against the Villistas. "The first step in the new scheme was to reorganize the
Chihuahua military district in such a way that the rivalry between
federal regulars and irregulars would be eliminated, or at least
minimized. Because contingents sent into Chihuahua would undoubtedly be made up largely of irregular volunteers, the Ministry
of War decided to place irregular commanders in charge of the
zone. Accordingly, Chihuahua was divided into three military districts, each under the command of an irregular officer. The northern district, with headquarters in Ciudad Juarez, would be
commanded by Jose Ines Salazar."21
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In the writ of habeas corpus prepared by Elfego Baca, Salazar
attempted to gain his freedom by claiming that his imprisonment
and confinement were illegal because he was not held by any
treaty nor was he charged with being a prisoner of war. He also
stated that he was not "one of those who crossed the river with
General Mercado and others after the battle of Ojinaga." Rather,
he had left Ojinaga about twelve days prior to the evacuation of
the city, crossed the river without incident, and then arrived in EI
Paso to visit his wife and three children. He left Mexico with no intention of returning to that country to help any of the contending
factions in the war. Salazar's declaration was supported by
General Mercado, who swore tha t on January 5, 1914, prior to the
evacuation of Ojinaga, Salazar had been released of all responsibilities and discharged. He then left Ojinaga on horseback and
unarmed. Mercado also declared that at Fort Wingate Salazar
had frequently said "that he hoped to be released and go and make
his home at Albuquerque, New Mexico." Mercado's deposition
was confirmed by others sworn to by Colonels Evaristo Perez and
R. M. Quevedo, Lt. Col. Alfonso Parra, and Major Zacarias
Parra. 22
Salazar's petition for release was denied and it was decided by
Distr~ct Court Judge William H. Pope on September 3, 1914, that
he be remanded to the custody of Captain G. H. Estes, executive
officer of the detention camp at Fort Wingate, New Mexico. The
grand jurors were also of the opinion that Salazar, having been
sworn to testify to the truth in the proceedings before the court,
had "willfully, corruptly ancl feloniously . . . stated material
matters which he did not then believe to be true, and thereby did
commit willful and corrupt perjury." The grand jurors were undoubtedly correct in their judgment, for General Mercado in 1916
wrote that Salazar had taken part in the battle of Ojinaga. 23 Mercado's statement of 1916 is confirmed by Pancho Villa. 24
On his return to Fort Wingate, Salazar learned that Washington
had ordered the release of the Mexican internees, but that he was
to be taken to Fort Bliss to await his trial for perjury scheduled for
November 30. He may have received some consolation from his
attorney Elfego Baca in this period, for as early as July 1, 1914,
Arturo M. Elias, provision visitador of consulates, had written the
office of the Secretary of War and Navy from EI Paso that General
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Roque Gomez was in Columbus, New Mexico, and would join the
guerrillas under the command of Colonel Manuel Gutierrez, Colonel Jose Quevedo, and Lt. Col. Silvestre Quevedo on Mexican
soil. He would assume command of these forces and their operations until the escape of General Jose Ines Salazar could be realized with funds furnished by the Secretariat. The plan for
Salazar's escape submitted for approval should be carefully considered because Salazar had innumerable sympathizers and no
less than a thousand men ready to follow him. "And by reason of
his exact knowledge of the state of Chihuahua, he can produce in
an effective manner the most terrible calamity for the rebels, and
it is almost certain that he will immediately possess himself of
Ciudad Juarez or any other important settlement. "25
Salazar was brought to the Bernalillo county jail located in Old
Town, Albuquerque, on November 16, 1914. Shortly after 9:30
p.m., on November 20, the telephone in the jailer's room rang and
acting Sheriff Charles Armijo's deputy answered the call. He was
informed that a stabbing had taken place at the White Star saloon
on Indian School road and an officer was needed. After Armijo
sent the jailer to handle the matter, two masked men broke into
the jail and attacked Armijo. He was handcuffed to a fence post
outside the jail after being overcome. His attackers then went to
the second floor of the jail and found Salazar waiting for them
with his suitcase packed. After releasing Salazar, the masked men
were "whizzed away in a covered automobile." Salazar allegedly
departed alone in a one-horse buggy. Thirty minutes after the sensational jail escape, posses with high-powered rifles were combing the immediate countryside for the fugitive. In view of General
Villa's hatred for the Federalist general, it was considered doubtful that he would cross into Mexico, but military authorities,
mounted watchmen on the border, and the police of border towns
were immediately wired by United States Marshal A. H. Hudspeth
to keep an alert lookout for the escaped prisoner. 26
Rumors soon abounded concerning Salazar's whereabouts, and
Secret Service agents busied themselves uncovering the conspiracy
to release him. In Deming, New Mexico, he was believed to have
sought safety in the mountains of southern New Mexico. Another
report circulated that Salazar had fled to Los Angeles and had
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crossed from that city into Baja California. Still another report
received and discounted by the Mexican consul in Albuquerque
said that Salazar had gone directly from Albuquerque to Naco,
where he had been placed in command of sao well-armed and
munitioned Carranzistas. Elfego Baca denied all reports and
asserted that Salazar had been murdered by his "enemies." Meanwhile, government agents kept close watch on Salazar's friends in
Albuquerque and El Paso, and the Constitutionalists in Chihuahua rushed troops to Pearson and Casas Grandes, where another
report located Salazar. 27
Either in El Paso or Chihuahua General Salazar made contact
with the El Paso group of Huertistas and Orozquistas who had
fled to that border city after Huerta's fall from power on July IS,
1914. Plans for a new revolution were discussed by the El Paso exiles, and on December 5 a proclamation signed by Salazar and
General Emilio Campa (a graduate physician of St. Louis, but of
Mexican parentage) and dated November 25, five days after
Salazar's escape, was issued in El Paso. This plan allegedly signed
"in the heart of Chihuahua" declared against Carranza and Villa
and affirmed that the Salazar-Campa movement was "for the purpose of bringing reform which will benefit all social classes, and
especially the poor." The proclamation was followed by an attack
on Casas Grandes and the cutting of the National Railroad line
between Juarez and Chihuahua City.28
The Salazar-Campa revolution soon bogged down. Salazar was
not recognized as a liberator, and no popular uprising took place
in Chihuahua. Instead, Salazar's men were severely defeated by
Villa's forces and Salazar once again crossed the border into the
United States and surrendered to American customs men. At Columbus, New Mexico, he told Steven Pinckney, an agent of the
Department of Justice, that Villa's soldiers had driven his small
guerrilla band from place to place in Sonora and Chihuahua. In
their last battle with the Villistas, every man of Salazar's band had
escaped as best he could. Salazar attempted to locate and regroup
his men after the rout, but failed to do so. Aware that "there is no
place he could go for food with any degree of safety" and that his
capture and death were certain if he remained in Chihuahua, he
crossed into Luna County, New Mexico, and stated that "he was
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willing to go anywhere the authorities desired without making
necessary extradition proceedings." On July 22, 1915, Salazar,
after being greeted by a large crowd at the railroad station in
Albuquerque, had supper under guard at the Alvarado Hotel. He
was then taken to Santa Fe and held incommunicado for nearly
five months in the New Mexico penitentiary, where he awaited
trial on the charge of perjury. 29
Salazar was represented in federal court by Albuquerque attorneys E. W. Dobson and H. C. Miller. The chief witness for the
defense was General Salvador Mercado, who stated that Salazar
had come to him on January 4, 1914, at Ojinaga and asked for his
discharge from the Federalist army "because enemies had threatened to kidnap Salazar's son at EI Paso." Salazar had been given
his discharge and issued a passport, and had left Ojinaga on the
night of January 5. Mercado's testimony, corroborated by General
Alberto Aduna, convinced the jury trying the Federalist general
that his version of the departure from Ojinaga for the United
States was true, and on December 9, 1915, he was acquitted by a
federal jury headed by Simon Gonzales. 30
After gaining his freedom, Salazar went to EI Paso and offered
his services to General Venustiano Carranza. General Marcelo
Caraveo, Salazar's "compadre," also made a similar offer. Salazar was quoted as stating that he believed "General Carranza's
government a stable one and a just one, and as a Mexican patriot I
am willing to go into the field with about 4,000 men and assist
General Obregon in driving every vestige of Villa ism from Mexico. I will accept Carranza absolutely and unqualifiedly."31
The Carranza government appears to have refused Salazar's services, for in April, 1915, armed expeditions were organized in EI
Paso against the Carranza government by Dr. Emilio Campa, Jose
Ines Salazar, and other rebels. On April 11, 1916, Licenciate Eliseo Arrendondo in Washington, D.C., wired Secretary of Foreign
Relations Candido Aguilar that a Felicista plot had been discovered in El Paso and the conspirators included Salazar and
Marcelo Caraveo. After calling upon all patriotic Mexicans to
rally to his standard, Salazar crossed the border into Mexico and
appeared in Bosque Bonito, Chihuahua, where he organized an
anti-North American movement. Salazar's ability to cross the
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border at will was attributed to the carelessness or tolerance
shown by General Gabriel Gavira, the military commander at
Juarez, who may have had a secret understanding with Salazar.
Salazar's movements alarmed the Mexican government, and isolated outposts in northern Mexico were called in and artillery was
sent to Chihuahua on special trains. In addition, a military
detachment under Captain Telesforo Dominguez of the Ojinaga
garrison sought Salazar's men in the field when it was reported
that he was planning to take this border town. 32
During this period of revolutionary activity Salazar appears to
have formed an alliance with Pancho Villa. Described as the
leader of a "gang," Salazar was included among the Villistas.
When Salazar's" army" was reduced to either 14 followers or "a
one-armed man, a one-eyed man, and a deaf mute," he applied for
and was granted amnesty. After being greeted in El Paso by General Gavira and joking with Mexican officers in the border city, he
enjoyed about two months of freedom.
In June a newly organized Legalist Party united Maderistas,
Huertistas, Catholics, cientificos, and other malcontents against
the Carranza regime. In August General Jacinto Trevino ordered
the arrest of Generals J. 1. Salazar, Marcelo Caraveo, Isaac
Arroyo, and 50 other, Mexicans. Salazar had displayed "suspicio~s actions toward the Vilia rebels" and all those arrested were
believed to be implicated in a plan to seize Chihuahua for the
Legalist Party. Following his arrest, Salazar was courtmartialed,
sentenced to death, and pending his execution was imprisoned in
the federal penitentiary.33 On September 16, 1916, Pancho Vilia
at the head of 800 men attacked Chihuahua City for the purpose
of freeing General Salazar and other political prisoners held by the
Carranza government. Although the city was guarded by several
thousand soldiers commanded by General Trevino and completely
surrounded by two electrically charged wire fences, the surprise
attack which took place at 3:30 a.m. was successful, and Villa's
soldiers quickly departed the city in perfect order with Salazar
and other comrades. 34
After Salazar was freed, he was made Villa's chief of staff. On
November 23, 1916, the Villista forces attacked Chihuahua City
once again. After four days of intense combat the Constitutionalist
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troops were forced to evacuate the city and retreated south, where
they were met by General Francisco Murguia's Second Division of
the Northeast. On December 2 a Villa proclamation called upon
all Mexicans to join in the overthrow of Carranza; at the same
time Salazar's forces had engaged Murguia's troops 36 miles
south of Chihuahua City. Salazar and Villa failed to halt the Second Division's advance, and on December 4 the Constitutionalists
recov~red the city. On December 27 Villista troops were still in
the area, and it was reported that these "bandits" were commanded by Salazar. General Murguia had ordered General Francisco Gonzalez and his men to reinforce another group in pursuit
of these "subverters of public order. "35
Early in the following year Salazar was mentioned in a government report that shows the link between the Villistas and the
Felicistas. On January 30, 1917, Jesus M. Arriola, chief of the
Mexican Secret Service, wrote to General Candido Aguilar and
told him that he had attended several meetings of the FelicistaClerical party in El Paso under the name of Jesus Molinar. The
group had commissioned Arriola to convey information to General Manuel Velazquez, chief of the Felicistas in Nuevo Leon and
Coahuila, and he had been instructed to tell Velazquez that the El
Paso exiles were agreed that he should join forces with the people
led by Jose Ines Salazar and Jose Isabel Robles. 36
In early February adherents of Salazar claimed he had briefly
visited El Paso for the purpose of completing arrangements for an
attack on Ciudad Juarez. He then crossed the border and stationed
his troops at Charco, just south of Casas Grandes. Rumors circulated that the Casas Grandes garrison had joined Salazar, and
that American cavalry had been dispatched from Ascension to attack a group of Villistas commanded by Salazar who were following General Pershing's forces too closely. Those who claimed to be
in Salazar's confidence in El Paso stated that he and Villa,
reported to be at the Bustillos ranch west of San Andres, wished to
avoid a clash with the Americans, and would not move toward the
border until Pershing's soldiers crossed the border. 37
When American troops left Mexico on February 5, troops commanded by Salazar and Rodrigo and Silvestre Quevedo occupied
the Mormon settlements of Colonia Juarez and Colonia Dublan
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respectively. Salazar then attacked the Carranzista garrison at
Guzman and killed or wounded all but six of the 65 troops stationed at that post. He also burned several bridges and cut the
Northwestern Railroad line south of the town. Shortly thereafter
Salazar occupied Ascension and before leaving that settlement for
Dos Molinos, 26 miles south of the border, he made it known that
he was an outright gringo hater. In his speech to the citizens of
Ascension he told them: "All of you who are true Mexicans, step
forward three paces; those of you who are friends of the gringos,
stay where you are." All those assembled advanced three paces.
He then recruited 34 partisans, and shouting Viva Villa! left the
town at the head of 500 troops.38
On February 12, 1917, Manuel E. Gonzalez in El Paso wrote
General Francisco Villa in San Andres, Chihuahua. In the letter
he stated that if Villa chose to attack Ciudad Juarez he should,
under no circumstances, appoint Jose Ines Salazar to lead the attack. Salazar's allegiance to the Villistas was not in doubt at El
Paso, but he was not liked by the Americans in El Paso and would
receive no help on that side of the border. Instead, Salazar would
face numerous obstacles because of the ill feeling in which he was
held in El Paso. 39
The expected attack of Juarez did not take place, but the Corner
ranch, sixty miles southeast of Hachitas, New Mexico, and on the
American side of the international boundary, was raided. Initially, it was believed that troops commanded by Salazar had
attacked the ranch, leased by the Palomas Land and Cattle Company. At a later date the raid was blaIl,led on bandits commanded
by Prudencio Miranda, an independent Mexican leader. In any
case, the mangled bodies of three Mormon cowboys, captured at
the Corner ranch, were found three miles across the Mexican
border on February 14. Salazar and his men were definitely
responsible for a raid on the Ojitos ranch in Mexico, located 45
miles southeast of the Corner ranch and owned by E. K. Warren
and Sons. At Ojitos, Salazar's troops took nine Mexican cowboys
and windmill tenders prisoners, as well as Ed ("Bunk") Spencer,
the American Negro foreman. On ~ebruary 15, Spencer reached
the border and informed Bob Morehead, general overseer of the
Warren ranches on the border and in Mexico, that Salazar de-
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manded $5,000 in gold. Should the ransom not be paid, Salazar
would burn the ranch house and confiscate the herd of 1,000 cattle on the ranch. Spencer also declared that Salazar had told him
that he "intended to raid an American city or town on the border
which would surpass Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico."
Women and children would not be harmed, but "all men of
Gringoland" would have to take care. Spencer then returned to
Ojitos, fearing that Salazar might carry out his threat to shoot his
Mexican wife should he not return to the ranch by sunrise on
February 21. 40
When E. K. Warren, millionaire Michigan cattleman, learned of
the Salazar demand, he stated that he would pay the $5,000 for
the release of Spencer's wife. At the same time, Colonel Jesus
Cardenas, commander of the thousand-man Twenty-fourth
Cavalry Regiment in Sonora, was ordered to leave Colonia
Morelos, Sonora, and proceed through Pulpito Pass to Ojitos to
attack Salazar. Meanwhile, Salazar wrote city detective Juan
Franco in EI Paso, and claimed that Carranza followers had
raided the Corner ranch and killed American citizens in order to
prejudice the Villa cause in the United States. Salazar also denied
making anti-American utterances. 41
Salazar's forces in late February of 1917 numbered about 800
men, 300 of whom were directly under him; the rest were divided
into bands of between 50 and 100 men. When Salazar received a
certified check, good only at an American bank, in lieu of the gold
he demanded, he left Ojitos after burning all of the ranch buildings and property his troops could not take with them. Salazar
next attacked the town of Carrizal held by Carranza forces. When
the garrison at Carrizal fled to Villa Ahumada, Salazar occupied
the town with Villistas, and then moved to San Miguel, 35 miles
southeast of Pearson. At San Miguel, Salazar ordered an attack on
Casas Grandes and directed other troops to attack the Mexican
Central Railroad. Villa agents in El Paso on March 9 claimed that
Salazar's troops had forced the surrender of 300 Carranzistas at
Casas Grandes though the town had not fallen. On March 13 it
was reported that 600 Carranza cavalry under General Francisco
Gonzalez were in pursuit of Salazar bandits who had wrecked a
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passenger train on the Mexico Central at Laguna, 150 miles south
of Juarez, killing forty Carranzista soldiers guarding the train. 42
The attack on Casas Grandes was followed by an assault on Madera, the most important town in northwest Chihuahua. Salazar
and 200 men struck at dusk on March 20. Twenty-two Carranzistas were either killed or wounded within the hour, and the remaining 128 men of the garrison fled the settlement. The town was
thoroughly looted after its capture, and Salazar only retreated
when a column of government troops numbering 500 men were
sighted nearing the town. Meanwhile, a week after the Madera
raid, Villa was 50 miles south of Chihuahua City and General
Francisco Murguia, the city's defender, declared that he would
reduce the city to cinders and commit suicide before Villa could
enter the place. At this same time, Salazar was reported to be advancing on Casas Grandes with a command of 1,500 men. 43
The Villistas suffered reverses in the next month. Salazar was
first defeated near EI Cumbre tunnel, and on April 18 troops led
by Villa and Salazar lost the battle of San Miguel de Babicora in
western Chihuahua to General Francisco Murguia. Several hundred Villistas were taken prisoner and 150 others were killed. Two
hundred horses and a large amount of equipment were also captured by Murguia. Villa and Salazar retreated toward the Sierra
Madre after the battle with Murguia's cavalry forces in hot pursuit. 44
Having escaped Murguia, Salazar was next reported to have
killed the superintendent of the San Juan mine, nine miles south of
Fort Hancock, Texas, on May 2. As he left San Juan and disappeared into the foothills with a ragged band of less than 100
men, however, the Villista general cut a sorry figure. He had lost
his horse, and the donkey he rode was so small that the tall guerrilla's feet almost touched the ground. On May 6 Salazar and his
men, perhaps seeking mounts and food, raided the T. O. ranch
located between EI Paso and Presidio. Several weeks later Salazar
. at the head of 700 desperate men appeared in Pearson, Chihuahua, and the rebel leader offered to surrender to the government
commander if he, Rodrigo Quevedo, the Aranda brothers, and
various other Villa chiefs, together with their men, were granted
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amnesty. Salazar had previously written Inspector General of
Mexican Consulates Andres Garcia that he was tired of fighting
and wished to rejoin his family and return to his small ranch. Garcia forwarded Salazar's letter to President Carranza and recommended that Salazar's request be granted. 45
Having quit Villa in June, Salazar left Pearson for the Ojinaga
district where he attempted to sell a pack train loaded with ammunition. He was kicked in the head by one of the pack mules,
however, and he left for Ascencion to recover from his accident.
There he again asked for amnesty, and was allowed to remain in
the district pending official action on his case in Mexico City. In
early August the Mexican consul in El Paso stated that Salazar
was mentally ill as a result of the accident and would have to go to
Mexico City for medical treatment. Shortly thereafter Hews was
received in El Paso of Salazar's death, but he had not succumbed
to his head wound; Jose Ines Salazar, rancher, rustler, "tramp,"
stonecutter, "bootblack," general, Magonista, Orozquista, Huertista, Felicista, Villista, and social revolutionary, had fallen at the
hands of a small detachment of the Casas Grandes civil guard
organized for the defense of the region.
Before his death he had fallen on evil days. In April he had commanded over a thousand men. In June the number had dwindled
to 70 badly armed and hungry men mounted on burros or decrepit
horses. At Ascension only three followers remained: Rodrigo and
Silvestre Quevedo and Manuel Gutierrez. On August 9, 1917,
Salazar's men went to the Nogales ranch where they were met by
a small contingent of cowboy home guards, who immediately
fired upon them and killed them. When the three failed to return
to camp, Salazar went in search of them. As he rode into the small
hamlet of Nogales, the guards fired and he fell from his saddle.
Salazar died in all likelihood wearing his big Stetson and certainly
with his boots on. 46
Although he appears to have been a fickle chameleon, there was
unquestionably something of the hero about Salazar. That he was
a friend of Praxedis Guerrero gives him honor. That he rose from
obscurity to the rank of general and once defeated and later fought
with Villa indicates that he had military talent. Campa, Orozco,
Huerta, Villa, and the men who followed Salazar attest that he
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was an able leader and warrior. He began well and died under
fire. He remains, like many others, "a member and a soldier of the
revolution."47
After the Salazar escapade in New Mexico, Elfego Baca, Salazar's attorney; Manuel U. Vigil: district attorney in Bernalillo
County; Trinidad C. de Baca, State Game Warden; Monico
Aranda; Carlos Armijo, deputy sheriff at the time Salazar
escaped; and Porfirio Saavedra were indicted for conspiracy on
April J 0, 191 S. The grand jurors at Santa Fe held that these men
and the Spaniard Celestino Otero, alias Pedro Abeyta, had "willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully and feloniously" conspired to
rescue Jose Ines Salazar from United States Marshal A. H.
Hudspeth. 48
The indictment charged that to effect the conspiracy, Deputy
Sheriff Charles Armijo had permitted the cell in which Salazar
was held to be opened by Celestino Otero and Monico Aranda.
Salazar then entered an automobile driven to the jail by C. de
Baca and was taken to Vigil's ranch, some five to eight miles north
of Albuquerque. Salazar remained at the ranch, "within sight of
the red spires of the Catholic church at Alameda" and "about
halfway between the North Fourth street road and the Santa Fe
railway tracks" until about November 28, 1914. During this time
he was hidden in a tunnel six feet under the patio of the ranch
house. Salazar left Vigil's ranch on horseback and on his way to
Mexico may have "skirted the Sandias and Manzanos, or perhaps
treked [sic] across the sands on the west bank of the Rio Grande
until he reached Valencia County. There he is said to have fallen
ill and to have been forced to halt for several days. When he
started again he hugged the mountains west of the Santa Fe
railway and crossed the international line not far from El Paso."49
On the same day that the indictment was handed down, Game
Warden C. de Baca declared that Special Agent Beckham of the
Department of Justice had offered him "immunity" if he would
tell all concerning the conspiracy. C. de Baca refused the offer and
denied any connection or knowledge of the crime, but he did admit to being in Albuquerque from November 19 to November 21.
During this period he had called on District Attorney Vigil, but it
was only for the purpose of offering Vigil his regrets over the death
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of one of the lawyer's relatives. When C. de Baca called at the
Vigil ranch, he learned that the attorney had left Albuquerque and
was in Gallup, New Mexico. C. de Baca also observed that there
were eight witnesses who would swear an alibi for him on the
night of November 20. Although C. de Baca claimed absolute innocence in the Salazar affair, it was reported that Governor
William C. McDonald intended to dismiss him from his office. 50
Elfego Baca, considered to be the principal figure in the conspiracy to free Salazar, was in a downtown bar in Albuquerque on
the night Salazar departed the county jail. 51 Baca is now a legend
in the Southwest and has appealed to conservatives and liberals
alike, as well as to Walt Disney Productions. An alleged friend of
Billy the Kid and acquaintance of Pancho Villa, Baca is chiefly
known for his part in a battle with a Texan mob of cowboys at
Frisco, New Mexico, in 1884, when from an abandoned adobe
shack he held off some 80 or more Anglos during a seige that
lasted two days, killing two of his attackers. Hundreds of bullets
perforated the adobe shack, but Baca left Frisco whole. Baca later
became district attorney for the territorial district in which
Socorro County was located, and also acted as attorney for the
local cattlemen's association. He belonged to the Republican
Party and made several unsuccessful attempts to be elected to the
House of Representatives. 52
All of the alleged conspirators that were suspected of taking part
in the rescue of General Salazar had alibis or explanations for
their actions except Celestino Otero. But on January 31, 1915,
prior to the indictments and trial, Otero was killed in a pistol duel
by Elfego Baca in El Paso, Texas. At the inquest, Baca stated that
while searching for his son, who had disappeared from New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, he and a Dr. F. B. Romero met
Otero in the lobby of the Paso de Norte Hotel. Otero supposedly
told Baca that a Mexican saloon keeper whom Baca had defended
in New Mexico when he had been indicted along with Jose Ines
Salazar for violation of neutrality laws, wished to see him. Eager
to collect the fee owed him for securing dismissal in federal court,
Baca and his friend Dr. Romero drove to the saloon. When they
parked Romero's car next to the tavern, Baca stated that Otero
hailed the two from the sidewalk. Otero then stepped forward and
"in Spanish made a vile remark about [Baca's] mother." Otero

Cell block from the old Bernalillo County Jail, in use from 1885 to 1925, from which Salazar escaped in 1914; now in
possession of the Museum of Albuquerque. Courtesy the Albuquerque Museum Photoarchives.
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then drew a pistol and fired a shot at Baca before the weapon
jammed. Baca drew his pistol and fired two rapid shots at Otero
from a distance of ten feet; fifteen minutes later Otero died on the
operating table at the police hospital. Baca drove away after
shooting Otero, but later telephoned the police and surrendered to
Captain W. D. Greet. He was booked on a charge of murder, but
was released under $7,000 bond on February 2. Although Baca
claimed that he knew Otero only by sight, Mrs. Otero said that she
had known Elfego Baca for about eight years. She had seen her
husband with Baca in Albuquerque, and claimed that once she
had been walking with her husband in Albuquerque when Baca
picked him up and took him for a ride in a car. She had waited for
her husband until he returned. During the course of the trial, she
stated that Otero had gone to collect some money from Baca. Mrs.
Otero's testimony evidently failed to impress the jury that tried
Baca on January 25, 1916, for after 12 minutes of deliberation
they agreed that the kil1ing of Otero was a clear case of self
defense. 53
Mrs. Otero was also the principal witness for the government in
the conspiracy trial, which began on December 15, 1915. She testified that she had been in the state penitentiary since the end of
the inquest after her husband's death for fear of Baca. She also
stated that her husband had been promised $1,000 for his part in
the Salazar escape. Her testimony, however, was weakened under
sharp cross-examination by A. B. Renehan for the defense. "You
wanted to get even, didn't you?" asked Renehan. "Yes," answered
Mrs. Otero. "You wanted to see both these men hang, didn't you?"
was the next question. "1 would like to see criminals hanged, if the
law permits it," replied the widow. This defense also attempted to
show that Mrs. Otero's general reputation was bad, and she herself seemed to confirm this by her testimony. When she was asked
whether she had been a prostitute both before and after her marriage, she shouted, "It is none of your business!"54
Both Vigil and Baca passionately denied any connection with
the conspiracy to free Salazar, but Vigil did observe that prior to
Otero's departure from Albuquerque he had told Otero to avoid
Elfego Baca. This advice, however, was given because Otero had
attempted to kill Baca more than once. Following all submission
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of evidence, attorneys O. A. Larrazolo and A. B. Renehan made
eloquent pleas for the defense, and the twelve Spanish-Americans
who formed the jury hearing the case found all the defendants innocent of the charge of conspiracy on December 18, 1915. 55
After his acquittal, Elfego Baca continued to practice law in
Albuquerque until his death at the age of 80. In contrast, Manuel
U. Vigil, his political career ended, decided to make a new start in
Mexico. Vigil was perhaps the most interesting and representative
New Mexican among those indicted. Although his ancestry was
New Mexican, he was born in Colorado and entered New Mexico
politics in a roundabout way. After receiving his law degree from
the University of Colorado in 1907, he moved to New Mexico and
in 1909 was elected district attorney of the second judicial district
of New Mexico, largely because of his close connections with the
influential O. A. Larrazolo. 56 Vigil in 1914 was only twenty-five
years old, and serving his second term as district attorney of Bernalillo County. He was considered "an attorney of high standing,"
and it was thought that he had a most promising future. The Salazar indictment, he was convinced, had ended his hopes in New
Mexico despite his acquittal.
Although the notice of Vigil's death in Mexico in 1940 states
that "he was connected with several American corporations, and
engaged in a very successful practice" in Mexico City, this may
not be entirely true. It appears that Vigil acted as an overseer of
banana workers in the tropical lowlands of Tabasco, and aided
American cultivators in their business dealings with the Mexican
government. Expatriate Vigil also appears to have been proGerman in his sympathies and blamed the American government
for ruining his career in New Mexico. Prior to his death he was afflicted with a tropical disease which forced him to leave Tabasco
and rejoin his family in Mexico City.57
In Mexico Vigil undoubtedly pondered the curious twists of fate
which had allied his destiny with the machination of Mexican
rebel Jose Ines Salazar. He must have questioned many times why
the Salazar incident had crushed his hopes and left Elfego Baca
untouched. He must have felt himself an unwilling victim of the
curious convolutions of the Mexican revolution which the life of
Salazar so dramatically represented.
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VIDA NUEVA: A REFLECTION OF
VILLISTA DIPLOMACY, 1914-1915
NECAH S. FURMAN

WHEN the new year began in 1914, Pancho Villa was the Mexican man of the hour. This stocky, mustachioed ex-bandido, then
Commander of the Division of the North, had won a decisive first
victory at Torreon October 1, 1913. He then proceeded to clear
the state of Chihuahua of Federal troops by attacking Chihuahua
City, Ciudad Juarez, and Tierra Blanca. Gaining control of both
the north- and southbound railroads, Villa drove the opposition
from Ojinaga across the Rio Grande into the United States. 1
The American government and the press both paid homage to
the victorious Villa-the New York Times by labelling him "the
Robin Hood of Mexico" and the United States government by
dealing with Villa through direct diplomatic channels as if he,
rather than Venustiano Carranza, were the new leader of the Mexican Constitutionalist movement. From this point on, Villa's name
occurs with increasing frequency in American diplomatic circles
and in state department papers. 2
Villa also enjoyed the goodwill of President Woodrow Wilson,
who had been inaugurated shortly after the Huerta coup d' Hat. In
his presidential address, Wilson revealed his position when he
called upon the Mexican people to initiate a free electoral system
and to eliminate Victoriano Huerta from the race for president. 3
In February, Wilson further demonstrated his friendship by refusing to recognize the Huerta regime and by lifting the arms embargo to provide for its quicker demise. To Villa, news that the
embargo had been lifted was' cause for celebration. Filled with
gratitude, he joyfully threw his hat into the air and proclaimed
Wilson to be "the most/just man in the world." "All Mexicans
0028-06206/78/0400-0171 $2.20/0
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would love him," he said, and "we will look upon the United
States as our greatest friend!"4
These circumstances, originating with Francisco Madero's
assassination, Huerta's ignominious rise to power, and Wilson's
refusal to recognize the Huerta government, provided the basis for
the pro-American attitude of the Villistas at the inception of 1914.
By then Villa had recognized his need for a means of communicating his views to the people. In a country where press censorship
was traditional and accepted, Villa would have been remiss not to
use the news media as a political tool. Consequently, it is not surprising to find Villa publishing his own newspaper Vida Nueva:
Diario Politico y de Informacion in April 1914. Originally under
the directorship of journalist Manuel Bauche Alcalde, the paper
became the official organ of the Villista faction, despite the fact
that the title implied its connection to the Constitutionalists and
Carranza. s
In his memoirs, Villa referred to Vida Nueva as "our newspaper" and stated that he used it as a vehicle for publication of his
laws and decrees and also as an organ to influence the people
against or to "offset Carranza's propaganda." This last statement
is significant in that it indicates the intense rivalry between Carranza and Villa for political support of the masses. It was wellknown that Carranza exerted considerable influence in the same
manner through government-controlled newspapers in other parts
of the country.6
Villa, however, was to use Vida Nueva to voice opposition to
whomever opposed him, including Huerta initially, Carranza indirectly and continuously, and the United States eventually.
Therefore, a careful study of this newspaper during these years is
valuable not only as an example of traditional use of the media by
Mexican political powers, but also for the mirror view it gives to
the attitude of the Villistas toward the United States-an attitude
that followed a pendulum path from pro-American, anti-Carranza
propaganda to anti-American diatribes. By the same token, it
reflects the rise and fall of Pancho Villa.
Although uneducated, Villa realized the value of creating a
favorable climate of opinion. He granted interviews to American
news correspondents, and in addition to the publication of Vida
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Nueva in Chihuahua and elsewhere, he reportedly paid an El Paso
paper a handsome fee to guarantee a good press in that border
city. His public relations consciousness also is reflected in his
acquisition of partial ownership in a motion picture concern to
record his victories on film. Critics like to say that he would postpone a battle in order to insure proper conditions for filming. 7
However, the major vehicle for the dissemination of Villista propaganda was Vida Nueva.
As the April issues of Vida Nueva went into publication in 1914,
a schism was developing between Carranza and VilIa. 8 The correlation between the timing for publication of the newspaper and
the developing hostility between the two Mexican leaders is noteworthy. One must conclude that Villa was in earnest when he
stated that the organ would be used to counter Carranza propaganda, although there are few signs of overt anti-Carranza sentiment expressed in the initial issue of the paper. The major means
of detracting from Carranza was initially to glorify VilIa, and to
issue statements and explanations to the people that often were
contrary to Carranza's official position.
During 1914, it was an easy matter for the editor to glorify Pancho Villa. The capture of Torreon for the second time especially
enhanced his reputation as a military leader. After making elaborate battle plans, providing railroad cars for the wounded, amassing supplies, and even employing American "barnstormers" to
pilot airplanes equipped with metal pipes loaded with dynamite,
the Villista forces held the town after what has been termed the
most difficult fighting of the revolution. 9 Vida Nueva welcomed
the conquering hero with two-inch headlines:
jjVIVA VILLA!! jjTORREON ES NUESTRO!!
ijHEROE DEL DOS DE ABRIL!!
The issue was dedicated "AI Gran General, a Francisco Villa"
and his invincible Division of the North. Villa and his forces were
lauded for their defeat of the "endless chain of criminal personalities, and in particular Victoriano Huerta." The hope was expressed that the Constitutionalists would be recognized because of
the fall of Torreon and because of what was publicized as "the
great spirit of cordiality toward the United States." Wilson's com-
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mendations to the Villistas for their humanitarianism, prevention
of property damage, and good treatment of prisoners also received
broad coverage. IO
This spirit of mutual admiration between the United States and
Villa was tempered somewhat by American fears that the Spaniards in the captured city might be executed. Knowing full well
Villa's intense dislike for the traditional overlords of his race, the
United States prevailed upon his desire for continued American
goodwill with the result that Villa simply expelled the Spaniards
from Mexico. II
Meanwhile, events of a more serious nature were complicating
diplomatic relations at Tampico where Huerta still held control. A
party of American sailors in uniform had gone ashore to obtain
gasoline when they were arrested at the Iturbide Bridge and
paraded through the streets by the Huertistas. To Rear Admiral
Henry C. Mayo this was an international affront to the United
States, and in retaliation, he insisted that the Federals hoist the
American flag and show their respect with a twenty-one gun
salute. To complicate matters further, while the United States
Congress was voting its support for Mayo, a German ship, the
Ypiranga, was landing in Veracruz with arms and munitions for
the Huerta forces. Rear Admiral Frank T. Fletcher, commander of
naval forces in the area, received orders to prevent delivery of the
cargo, and on April 21, the American Marines landed and took
possession of the city.12
President Wilson hastened to assure Carranza that the United
States had no desire for war with Mexico, that they were simply
acting in reprisal for the actions and insults of Huerta. Nevertheless, Carranza's response showed that he considered it an invasion of Mexican territory. With the exception of Villa, Carranza
was supported in this position by his generals. 13 The Villista reaction to the affair was well-expressed in Vida Nueva where
headlines read "Huerta Once Again Betrays the Fatherland- Provokes an International Conflict to Save Himself." The article
claimed that Huerta instigated the Tampico situation in a theatrical attempt to rally the Mexican people to his support by causing
an incident that would result in American intervention. The journalist stressed that Huerta could not expect to escape punishment.
According to Villa's view, Huerta's actions were simply diver-
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sionary tactics that endangered MexicancAmerican relations; and
contrary to the reaction of Carranza, Villa did not believe that intervention warranted war. 14
Vida Nueva devoted considerable space to the Tampico incident, assuring the Mexican people that the United States meant
them no harm, and continuing to feature the affair as being
another among the many crimes of Victoriano Huerta. A headline
in the April 16, 1914, issue admitted that the deployment of the
American fleet to the port of Tampico might yield "lamentable
consequences"; yet, on the same page, another title relayed word
from the United States Department of the Navy that the American
administration hoped that the Constitutionalists would not misinterpret naval maneuvers in Mexican waters, stating that their
objective was simply to force Huerta to accede to the demanded
salute. IS
Reflective not only of pro-Americanism, the articles in Vida
Nueva at this point showed a distinct tendency to influence and
mold the mind-set of the Mexican readers, urging, for example,
"rejoicing. . . that the terrible hecatomb of international war, so
innobly provoked, not be added to the afflictions our country is
already suffering. "16 In a personal interview, Villa very clearly expressed his stand on the Tampico and Veracruz incidents. Primarily, he said that the affair was a problem between General Huerta
and Woodrow Wilson. Then, asked what would happen to Americans in the event of war between Mexico and the United .States,
Villa responded; "American civilians, living in Constitutionalist
controlled territories would be treated according to the rules of
war followed by civilized countries." Questioned as to his course
of action if the Mexican people in Constitutionalist territory were
to show anti-American tendencies and personal reprisals, Villa
responded: "The army under my command has been sufficiently
powerful to drive 25,000 well-armed soldiers from rebel territory;
and I believe it [the Villista army] would be sufficient to stifle any
anti-American uprising that might occur, although I do not
believe that the Tampico incident merits a war between the two
nations."17
Despite Villa's strong words of support, these incidents at Tampico and Veracruz were the cause for the issuance of the organ's
most critical public position to date. The headline read "The In~
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tervention is Unjustified," but the explanation rationalized that intervention, saying that the peaceful occupation of Veracruz was
caused by Federalist treason. Furthermore, the journalist warned
that the United States and Mexico would become the laughingstock of the world if they fought each other "to please a madman," meaning Huerta. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the
two countries were tied socially and economically and that it
would be mutually beneficial for them to work together. Thus,
under cover of direct and abusive barbs at Huerta, the Villista
organ also opposed the diplomacy of Carranza, who was dealing
with the Americans as interventionists. IS
The American occupation of Veracruz did not alter Villa's personal pro-American stance, although Carranzista newspapers attempted to align Villa with the hostile views of the First Chief.
From the United States, Wilson sent Special Agent for the State
Department George C. Carothers to meet with Villa to ascertain
his true feelings about the situation. At a conference in Juarez,
Villa assured Carothers "that there would be no war between the
United States and the Constitutionalists; that he [Wilson] is too
good a friend of ours and considers us too good friends of theirs for
us to engage in a war which neither side desires"; then with characteristic bluntness, he concluded by pointing out that other nations would laugh and say, "The little drunkard has succeeded in
drawing them in."19
In this spirit of friendship, Villa announced in Vida Nueva that
a train would be provided to take the American families in Chihuahua back to the United States. By April 28, 1914, Villa gave
another interview, reassuring the people that the crisis was past
and mentioning again that the whole problem had been provoked
by "enemies of the people's cause." When asked about his feelings
concerning editors in El Paso who published newspapers in Spanish criticizing the United States government, he replied:
I have read them and the writings are calculated to cause hate between certain classes, and they should not be tolerated in times like
these. If these writers are not pleased with the United States, let
them come to this side if they want to fight, as they say they do in
their editorials. It will be my pleasure to give them arms and pay
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their trip to Saltillo where they will have the opportunity to fight
with the true friends of Mexico. 20

Villa obviously had no tolerance at this time for criticism of the
United States from either side of the border. Eventually, the affair
was turned over to mediation by the ABC powers at the Niagara
Falls Conference in New York. 21 As the summer ended, the United
States became increasingly preoccupied with the war machine in
Europe, but it was clear that the Veracruz intervention might well
have ended in open conflict had it not been for the efforts of Villa
in behalf of the United States, particularly considering the antiAmericanism of Carranza and his generals.
While the United States was concerned with developments on
the European front, the revolution in Mexico proceeded along its
violent course. Constitutionalist forces captured Tampico on May
14, 1914; and on May 20, Villa added Saltillo to his list of conquests. He had regained control of Zacatecas by June 23, 1914,
against Carranza's orders. The resultant rift brewing between
Carranza and Villa postponed the ultimate victory.22 Realizing
the problems a split would create, the United States attempted to
heal the breach by sending Carothers to consult with Villa once
again. Carothers reported that Villa was well aware of the danger,
but showed surprise that "the great nation" [United States] could
not see Carranza for what he was.
By July, Carranza and Villa had patched up their differences
much according to the status quo, with Carranza as First Chief
and Villa as Commander of the Division of the North. However,
one important change occurred; Carranza requested that the
United States close the border to the shipment of munitions to any
place other than Tampico where he held control, effectively eliminating Villa's source of supply. During this period of tension,
Villa assured the United States and the Mexican people of his absolute confidence in W.ilson. 23
After refusing the mediation of the ABC powers, Carranza
marched into Mexico City.24 Not long thereafter Carranza's and
Villa's forces faced each other in combat at Naco, Sonora. When
several citizens were wounded on the American side of the Rio
Grande, the United States invited Villa and Carranzista General
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Alvaro Obregon to a conference to mediate their differences and
make arrangements for the protection of American lives. Vida
Nueva covered the "grand reception" that the two generals received in El Paso, Texas, prior to proceeding to Sonora where they
settled the dispute. The renewed cordiality between Carranza and
Villa led to a joint request that the American forces be withdrawn
from Veracruz, but the cordiality was only temporary. By Septembee 23, 1914, Vice Consul John Silliman sent a telegram to the
Secretary of State, reading: "Break between Villa and Carranza is
now hopeless. Villa in telegram to Carranza yesterday disowns
him as First Chief, . . ." As Villa explained to the American officials, he had taken this action because he felt that Carranza was
incapable of establishing a democratic government. 25
On September 30, 1914, Villa issued his "Manifesto to the Mexican People," publicly indicting Carranza for failing to keep his
word on the issues of free elections and the establishment of a civil
government. 26 Villa had begun to declare himself openly against
Carranza even prior to this. Using Vida Nueva as his podium, he
had appealed dramatically to his constituents, asking them to
recall the "ideals of the Revolution," reminding them that these
ideals were still being guarded by the Division of the North, which
he said, "will nurture them in the face of all ambition, because
they are consecrated by popular sentiment, watered by the blood
of its martyrs."27 With publication of Villa's Manifesto, there was
no turning back, although the generals and Villa made plans to
hold a convention at Aguascalientes with the objective of setting
up the framework for a new government. By early November
1914, Vida Nueva was able to announce triumphantly: "The
Assembly has decided to let Carranza go"; and in smaller print,
"It also resolved that G. Villa should give up his command as
Division Chief. "28
Carranza responded to his dismissal with his own proclamation
disowning the Convention for not adhering to his demands. The
Villista organ jubilantly announced that "At Last the Ambitious
Porfirist, V. Carranza, has Unmasked Himself." Four days later,
the Convention allied themselves firmly with Villa and declared
Carranza in rebellion. General Eulalio Gutierrez became the provisional president, while generals Pablo Gonzalez and Alvaro
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Obregon withdrew and joined Carranza at Veracruz. Once again
Mexico was in the throes of revolution. 29
In this new phase of the fighting, General Emiliano Zapata
decided to join Villa after a meeting in the ancient town of
Xochimilco. Carothers, who witnessed the meeting, said that the
two "locked arms and went to the municipal school building,
where they were to hold a conference. . . . Villa finally opened
the conversation and both of them fell to discussing a character
neither liked-Carranza." On December 6, 1914, Villa and
Zapata with approximately 30,000 men made an impressive entry
into Mexico City where the provisional president and the
diplomatic corps reviewed the troops.30
During this period when the provisional government under Villa
held sway, Vida Nueva reported that circulars were being
distributed, supposedly by Masons of the Scottish Rite, inciting
Mexicans to attack Americans in Veracruz. According to editorial
interpretation, however, this was simply another ploy of Carranza's. Furthermore, the writer pointed out that the Americans
would have left long ago if Cam;lllza had been willing to comply
with the conditions imposed by the United States. The paper admitted that the United States occupation was a "shame," but the
blame rested with the Carranzistas. 31 Vida Nueva covered
American plans for evacuation of Veracruz conscientiously, but
voiced no criticism of United States procedures. Villa still enjoyed
Wilson's support, and he, in turn, continued to act as their public
relations man in Mexico. Editorials assured the people that money
collected by the customs office of the port would be turned over to
Mexico when the government had stabilized, and furthermore,
that the United States would not take part in the internal politics
of the country.32
Toward the last week in December 1914, a split developed between the provisional president Gutierrez and Villa. Gutierrez
planned to abandon the capital of the provisional government,
San Luis Potosi; and when Villa learned of this, he sent a detachment of his own men to guard the president-in effect, placing
him under house arrest. By January 16, 1915, Gutierrez managed
to escape, taking with him "ten millions of public funds." Villa,in
the meantime, was given a vote of confidence by the Convention
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and again confirmed as Commander in Chief, while the United
States urged Carranza and Obregon to take effective measures to
protect life and property belonging to American citizens. 33 Despite
the revival of the Revolution under Villa and Carranza, William
Jennings Bryan promised that there would be no intervention
while he was Secretary of State and expressed his "unshakeable
confidence in Villa. "34
During the next few months, the Villistas found themselves involved in an international guessing game, trying to determine
which faction the United States would recognize. In February,
news analysists reported that the Department of State in Washington had announced that Villa had the advantage, yet, Wilson had
started showing some concern over the bad conditions in the Mexican capital. 35
For the first time the Villista paper seemed uncertain of the
American position. A headline classified the attitude of the United
States as "unknown" one day and then stated with certitude a few
days later that the government of the Convention "would soon be
recognized. "36 Nevertheless, the staff continued to use Vida Nueva
as an extensive propaganda tool. Villa's defeat at Celaya, for example, was transformed into "a brilliant triumph" under their
imaginative editing. In all fairness, however, accounts of the outcome of this battle were contradictory even in United States
papers, possibly because both Villa and Carranza initially
claimed the victory. Later, in reference to Celaya, Vida Nueva explained that "Regrouping does not mean defeat." In retrospect,
historians have classified the reverses that Villa suffered at Celaya
as "decisive." Not only was it damaging to his reputation as a
military hero, but it also may have lessened his credibility in the
eyes of Woodrow Wilson. 37
The next month, the American president sent his special envoy
Duval West to interview both Villa and Carranza and report his
impressions and findings. Vida Nueva covered the visit of West
without criticism of Wilson's tactics, yet, they more than likely
were aware that the results of the visit would have an impact on
his decision-making regarding recognition. West's presence
reflected Wilson's renewed interest in the Mexican situation; and
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rumors of intervention, previously forgotten because of the European war, were revived by the end of May.JB To the Villistas,
Wilson's announcement of his intention to make "a brief declaration" on Mexico was interpreted accurately as the precursor of a
new policy. To date, Villa had not faltered in his pattern of
cooperation and support for United States diplomacy. He had, in
fact, announced on different occasions his willingness to come to
an agreement, even if it meant eliminating himself from the leadership role. Carranza, likewise, continued his pattern of truculent
disregard for the wishes of the United States. J9
Wilson waited until early summer before making his statement
to the Mexican public. His declaration expressed concern for the
tragic state of Mexico's land and her starving people, advising
them that the United States would soon make a decision to support
a single party if the warring factions could not bring themselves to
uni teo 40 Wilson's statement of June 2, 1915, was one of the first indications that the United States was going to play the vacillating
game of "watchful waiting." For the first time, Villa found it
necessary to go on the defensive. In his announcement, for example, Wilson had charged that the "Central Authority" at Mexico
City had been "undermined and its authority denied by those who
were expected to support it." Villa responded by stating that Carranza had not been recognized because he had not accepted the
platform of the Revolution, thereby repudiating it even though the
Constitutionalists had convoked it. In a lengthy and respectful letter to Wilson, Villa spoke of his attempts at instituting a government based on free elections and the fact that both he and General
Obreg6n had made a proposal to that effect-a proposal that had
been rejected by Carranza. 4 !
A charge even more offensive to Villa was Wilson's claim that
there was no protection for Mexico's citizens or for the citizens of
nations residing in Mexico. Vilia, with few exceptions, had been
extremely cooperative in providing for protection of Americans
especially. Even in his dealings with the Spaniards, whom he
detested, he had adhered to the will of President Wilson to expel
rather than execute them. 42 In effect, Wilson's mandate and
Villa's response mark the beginning of a transition in Villista-
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American relations that would culminate in the October 19,
1915, recognition of Carranza's de facto government.
By this time, Villa had suffered additional losses on the battlefield, at Leon as well as at Celaya; and now it appeared that he
also had suffered a loss in prestige on the diplomatic front. Villa
consistently had bowed to the wishes of the American president
with few exceptions. He had been led to believe that he had their
support-after all, he was the proponent of the Wilsonian ideal of
democratic elections; but now Wilson was making accusations
which Villa felt were unwarranted. Had he not consistently supported the actions of the United States in Mexico, even to the extent of rationalizing American intervention in Veracruz? Thus,
Wilson's "watchful waiting" could only have been received by
Villa as a personal as well as military and political betrayal.
Nevertheless, he did not alter his public stance, believing perhaps
that the ultimate decision would go in his favor. The pages of Vida
Nueva still expressed his confidence in Wilson and showed that he
hoped for-in fact, expected-recognition.
Licenciado Lagos Chazaro, Villista delegate from the state of
Chihuahua, who had been elected by the Convention after Gonzalez Garza had been deposed, answered Wilson's note in Vida
Nueva. He assured the people that even though the Villista and
Carranza factions could not settle their disagreements as Wilson
desired and even though the United States might have to intervene, their occupation would be "friendly" and in no way pose
a threat to the Mexican people. 43 Yet, in the editorial section of
that same issue, a story about twin mountains was very revealing:
Las Voces de Los Colonos-Otra Vez Dialogaron Las Montanas
Gemelas Dijo la del penacho humeante:
'2,Que rumor es que viene del norte?'
Y replica la de la copa de nieve:
'Son voces de amenaza de los fuertes.'
'2, Y a quien amenazan?'
A los que suponen debiles.'
'jTodavfa 10 mismo! Y crei que la fuerza ya estaba de parte de la
razan, del derecho, y de la justiciar
'No hermana. Aun no: jAcaso mas tarde!'
Y enmudecieron otra vez las gigantescas moles con sus altivas cum-
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bres dominando el inmenso valle como dos monumentos erigidos
por el supremo Dios para eterI)izar la memoria de una raza. 44
Using the twin mountains in the Valley of Mexico to symbolize the
people, the ensuing dialogue presented a contradictory view of the
United States as "the threatening voice of the strong" directed
against the weak, meaning Mexico, and referring to the threat of
intervention. The growing disillusionment of the people is shown
in the question asked by the mountain with the smoking crest: "I
thought that force was now on the side of reason, law, and justice?" indicating that the Villistas thought that the United States
would intervene in their behalf or grant recognition-but with
sadness and disappointment, the answer is given: "No, sister, not
yet: Maybe later." The story, in picturesque terms, reveals not
only disillusionment with the vacillation of the United States, but
also the hope that the "threatening power of the North" would
come to its senses eventually and support the Villistas in what they
believed to be their righteous cause. 45
Carranza, in the meantime, continued with tactics diametrically opposed to those of Villa. The ploy of the First Chief was to
force recognition through military might and a planned program
of depredations along the southern border. After the capture of a
flag bearing the slogan: "Liberating Army of the Mexicans in
Texas," an investigation followed which revealed that this group
had been organized as part of the "Plan de San Diego," a movement to regain Texas and other states for the Mexicans. Vida
Nueva charged that the Carranzistas were responsible for the
movement and that the outrages along the border were being perpetrated in hopes of causing a war with the United States. 46
Certain factors seemed to substantiate that position. Carranza,
for example, continued his belligerency in direct violation of a
pact signed with General Hugh Scott to protect American citizens.
And in addition to the attack on Naco, Sonora, an increasingly
large number of violations of American ,territory and damage to
American life and property began to occur. The American reaction to Mexican infringement on United States territory also
became more serious and reprisals more commonplace. 41
By mid-August, 1915, these revolutionary activities along the
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border and coverage of the Pan-American Conference dominated
the pages of Vida' Nueva. Depredations on the border frontier were
of such a nature as to infuriate Texas borderlanders, but the
atrocities were not restricted to one side. For example, on
September 16, 1915, Vida Nueva reported that five Mexicans had
been killed by the "Yankees." The story described details of the
"cruel murder" of these men by Texas Rangers in San Benito. One
week later, a Carranzista officer crossed the Rio Grande at Los
Pelados with a detachment of troops recently arrived from Matamoros and, landing on American soil, attacked a small detachment of American soldiers stationed at the crossing, killing two of
them. One of the men was carried across and murdered on the
Mexican side; his ears and head cut off; and his body thrown into
the river. 48
Vida Nueva repeatedly linked the border activities with the Carranzistas. Editorials voiced concern that the activities of these
renegades compromised the negotiations of the Pan-American
Congress in progress since August 10, 1915, in New York. In addition to problems along the border, it was revealed that agents of
Carranza were acting as agitators at the meeting. Carranza, as opposed to Villa, obviously was not interested in pacification. He instructed Juan E. Arredondo to inform the Wilson administration
that "the only possible, just and acceptable solution would be to
allow the revolution to take its natural course until the complete
triumph of the party which represents the greatest needs and
popularity. "49 Considering Carranza's recent victories and conversely, Villa's defeats, this position was perhaps a logical one.
The editor felt that the outcome of the expected battle outside
Torreon as well as the struggle taking place in northern Mexico
would be an influential factor in the forthcoming decision of the
Pan-American Conference regarding recognition. 50
Meanwhile the atrocities and border raids in South Texas continued. Raids were conducted at Brownsville, Red House Ferry,
Progreso Post Office, and Los Pelados, as well as on American
mining properties in Mexico. Additional evidence linked the raids
to the Plan de San Diego and Carranza. Flags found at battle
scenes after the assault on San Ignacio and Webb Station lent
credibility to the reports promulgated in Vida Nueva. A message
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intercepted from the Germans revealed the efforts of that country
in instigating uprisings in Texas, and testimony of individuals
before the Fall Committee in later years were to add credence to
the claims that Carranza was responsible for the raids. A newspaper of Laredo, Texas, El Progreso, known to be an organ of Carranza, had been publishing articles of what was termed "the
most incendiary nature," assailing Wilson. 51 Another paper, El
Dem6crata of Matamoros, published circulars urging Mexico to
unite in fighting the Texas Revolution; and in El Paso, the town
awoke one morning to find banners flying in the streets and on
buildings calling upon the Mexican Americans to rise up in arms
and overthrow the government of the United States. 52
Vida Nueva continued to publish reports, which were denied,
connecting Carranza to the movement. One such report concerned an invader who had been killed with documents on his person showing him to be a Carranzista officer. It was also reported
that Carranzista soldiers joined the guerrillas after the Battle of
Reynosa. 53 Carranza's objective was to continue.harrassment until
the United States was forced to recognize the de facto government.
From the German viewpoint, if they could involve the United
States in a war with Mexico, the chances of American involvement
in the European theatre would be lessened.
By this time, the temper of some of the articles in Vida Nueva
verged on desperation, as if the Villistas were making a final
urgent attempt to persuade the American administration of the
righteousness of their cause. The editor warned the United States
that recognition of the Carranza government would mean, in effect, that Wilson himself would have to assume the responsibility
for losses caused by the Texas depredations. 54 Yet, the paper was
still basically pro-American. When reporting news from the European theatre, for example, Vida Nueva sided with the United
States against "The Atrocities of the Germans in France."55 But
the hour of decision was approaching. By September 24, 1915, the
headlines openly questioned the "outcome of the Mexican situation." Both sides, according to Vida Nueva were equally strong,
therefore neither side would ever win; constant fighting would
simply debilitate the country. 56
From September 25 to October 5, publication of Vida Nueva
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was suspended. The explanation given was that employees from
the printing shop were absent, but there was no elaboration concerning the reasons for their absence. It does appear significant,
however, that on the same page the administration of the paper
chose to make an announcement to the effect that they had attempted to fight the revolution through publications of Vida
Nueva, and that the paper and staff had been "always proud to
serve," from its inception as "the Voice of the Revolution. "57 Ending on a valiant note, the article declared: "It is for these reasons
that the future does not frighten us, nor does the present sadden us,
given that great social upheavals, of necessity, require great
sacrifices. We have faith in the triumph of our cause."58 As late as
October 7, 1915, the Villistas were attempting to bolster the
morale of their followers. "Nothing is Lost" ran the headlines for
this date followed by a lengthy defense of Villa's situation. A statement advised the people that "the supposed military supremacy of
Carranza merely exists in the imagination of his supporters and in
the fantastic legends of the Foreign Press."59 Yet, the tone of the
releases indicated clearly an awareness of the desperate status of
their cause.
Other Mexican leaders, such as Emiliano Zapata, seemed to be
aware that Carranza would be recognized. He warned that the
fighting would only be intensified if this were to occur. "Five
years of fighting," he pronounced, "do not affect the spirit of those
who fight for their rights."60
Just a few days later that "spirit" was severely tested when on
October 9, 1915, the United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the
ministers from Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala decided to recognize the Carranza government. The release given to the press
stated that they considered it "the only party possessing the essentials for recognition as the de facto government of Mexico." The
United States did not officially recognize Carranza until October
19, 1915; and on that same day, President Wilson imposed an embargo on arms and munitions. 61
While the United States and the Latin American countries were
deciding the fate of Mexico, Pancho Villa and his still large but
somewhat disorganized forces were operating in the state of Chi-
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huahua. It was here in Juarez that Villa learned the incredible
news that his enemy had been recognized. He was giving an interview to a member of the El Paso press and expounding on his
twenty-two years as a champion for the cause of liberty and justice
for the Mexican people, when he mentioned the sympathy of the
"great President Wilson" for his suffering countrymen. The allusion to Wilson brought forth a question:
"Dispatches from Washington indicate, General Villa, that it is
almost certain that the government of the United States will recognize Carranza. Have you any comment on this?"
Instantly, an expression of gloom passed over the eyes and face of
General Villa:
"I did not know this," he said, "Is it true? Are you sure? Those
dispatches are authentic? Carranza! Recognize Carranza? The government of Washington recognized the faction of Carranza-Are
you sure this news is true?"
The reporter repeated that it was true. There was a brief pause, and
General Villa began to speak with some difficulty:
"Washington will recognize Carranza," he said reflectively.
"President Wilson will recognize the Carranzista faction and other
governments will recognize him too. Very good friend, what has to
I be will be; we will wait and see. It may be that it will make no difference.' '62

Obviously stunned, VilIa must have felt a tremendous sense of
betrayal. Commenting further, he noted that recognition of Carranza could only have been granted by a nation not wishing to
see Mexico at peace. "Compared with what may come," he said,
"the Mexican Revolution of these last four years would only be
child's play; the new one would be a war without clemency."
Villa stressed that he had respected and protected American interests while Carranza had not. He concluded by saying, "You
have told me that Carranza will be recognized, but I cannot
believe it. "63
By the end of November 1915, Villa had issued another manifesto to the Mexican public, spelling out his disenchantment with
Wilson and, in effect, the new Villista policy. 64 In his decree, Villa
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protested Wilson's brand of diplomacy, calling him "only a tartuffe capable of selling himself to the Potentates. "65
Rumors persisted into the New Year to the effect that Wilson
would inevitably withdraw recognition. 66 Perhaps to help Wilson
with his decision, and true to his word, Villa attacked Agua
Prieta, but the field fortifications and searchlights illuminating the
battlefield worked to his disadvantage. Villa felt that the lights
had been placed there by the United States Army, and his bitterness toward his onetime friend increased. After another defeat at
Hermosillo, Villa's military power was fragmented. 67 It became
apparent that "La Vida Nueva," the new life, under Villa was not
to be. True to his predictions, the battles continued after recognition of Carranza, but according to older ground rules-the bandido tactics of an earlier day. Rejected by the country he had
respected and supported, Villa was to vent his bitterness and hostility at Santa Ysabel and Columbus, New Mexico.
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Book Reviews
THE SPANISH Roy AL CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS: INSTRUMENTOF BOURBON REFORM, 1764-1815. By Janet Fireman. Glendale, California: The Arthur Clark Company, 1977. Pp. 250. M;ps, appendices. $16.95.
DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, the Spanish Bourbon reformers employed
professional army officers to implement new programs and to serve in a wide
variety of administrative posts. On the northern frontiers of New Spain, chronic
violence with the Indians, dangers of foreign intrusions into sparsely settled territories, and scientific curiosity, presented enormous challenges. Accurate data
and technical expertise to carry out projects became essential prerequisites in
provinces which had not been fully explored let alone developed. Within the
Spanish army, the elite Royal Corps of Engineers was recognized as the unit best
suited to perform these tasks and to support the implementation of imperial
policies. Janet Fireman is the first historian to fully appreciate the impact of individual engineers on the frontier and to suggest the importance of their work.
Not only did these men plan fortifications and draft accurate maps, but they
surveyed roads, planned bridges and hydraulic works as well as teaching, governing, and preparing reports which brought modern scientific methodology to
the isolated Provincias Internas.
As Professor Fireman points out, each engineer assigned to the frontier provinces had to be willing to accept a term of harsh life on the trail. Beginning with
Francisco'Alvarez Barreiro, who in 1718 and 1719 travelled 8,000 miles in 45
months, the tradition of hard work and comparatively little personal recognition
or gain was established for the engineering officers. Following the Seven Years'
War with the rapid expansion of the military presence throughout New Spain,
additional engineers were required to supervise the construction of fortifications
along the coasts and inland from Veracruz to Mexico City. The visit of Jose de
Galvez with his interest in northern development and defense brought the
engineers into a central role. Francisco Fersen evaluated the western borderlands
and, in Fireman's view, set the pattern for future engineers' reports. He was
followed by Nicolas de Lafora who accompanied the Marques de Rubi on his
mission to evaluate the northern presidios and defenses. Lafora kept an excellent
diary of the 7,600-mile tour and prepared the detailed maps which went into the
Reglamento of 1772 restructuring the frontier defensive system.
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Of all the army engineers to serve in New Spain, Fireman devotes most attention to Miguel Costanso, whose career spanned the late colonial period and
whose activities were particularly important and varied. Reflecting Galvez's
concern about Russian or British penetration into Alta California, Costanso was
sent with the first expeditions to prepare plans for settlement and defensive
works. In the process, he became a great exponent of California settlement as
well as a specialist on matters dealing with the northern province. Long after he
departed from California, he was able to playa significant advisory role on frontier policy. Unlike many observers, Costanso promoted immigration schemes
and envisaged trans-Pacific trade between Alta California and the Orient.
Unfortunately for Spanish interests, the labors of a few talented engineers
could not in itself strengthen the northern frontiers. Detailed reports went
unheeded and plans were not implemented because funds were diverted to more
pressing concerns. Later reports portrayed a rather pessimistic outlook: in 1795,
for example, engineer Alberto de Cordoba found that the California defenses
were useless; fortifications were weak, cannons could not fire across harbor entrances, and some of the artillerymen were incompetent to fire their cannon.
The subject matter of this book does cause the author some problems. Many
engineers spent only a few months or years in the Borderlands and then went on
to other commissions in New Spain or elsewhere in the empire. Professor
Fireman is tempted to trace their careers-occasionally drifting away from the
frontier subject matter at hand. Costanso's career, which spanned fully seventeen
viceregal terms, contributed more to projects in central New Spain than on the
frontier. Besides preparing plans for roads and fortifications, he was consulted
on diverse matters such as park planning, building maintenance, or when needed
he could be pressed to lecture on mathematics and architecture. While this
material is of considerable interest for the history of eighteenth-century Mexico,
it might be better integrated into a more general study of the engineers and of the
army of New Spain. There are a number of published sources available which
might have added a little more scope. At the same time, however, the author has
done an excellent job in pointing out the importance of the army engineers in the
Borderlands. The primary research in Spanish, Mexican, and United States archives is thorough-particularly in light of the fact that access to some collections is difficult and indexes are often poor or nonexistent. Both the monograph
and the eight appendices, which give an accurate flavor of the engineer's
enlightenment and curiosity, should be of considerable interest to specialists and
general readers.
University of Calgary

CHRISTON I. ARCHER

SPANISH MISSION CHURCHES OF NEW MEXico. By L. Bradford Prince. Glorieta:
Rio Grande Press, 1977. Pp. 386. Illus., index. $25.00.
ACCORDING TO HIS DIARY. LeBaron Bradford Prince, newly appointed Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of New Mexico Territory, arrived in Santa Fe on
Saturday, February 8, 1879, totally exhausted from the long cross-country
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railroad trip. Two days later, at the age of thirty-nine, he presided in court. As
Chief Justice, then Governor for four years, and active Republican leader for
forty years, Prince became well known regionally and nationally. Political involvement, however, did not interfere with his infatuation with the history and
culture of New Mexico. Among many other activities he found time to write eight
books and monographs, all dealing with this area. This volume, published seven
years before his death in 1922, is the last and possibly the best of his writings
which, interestingly enough, he sold personally.
Prince not only visited the mission sites but carefully measured them as well as
other noteworthy structures nearby. He mentions that he took "kodak pictures"
of as many of them as possible but these, unfortunately, did not reproduce well.
In addition, he researched and wrote a history of each based on the documents
then available to him. Since 1915, the year of publication, different spellings of
place names have been adopted and more accurate information has become
available but these weaknesses do not detract from the main objective Prince
had in mind, which was to convince the people of New Mexico that their sacred
edifices were far superior in antiquity and variety to those of California and that
something had to be done quickly to preserve those still standing from destruction by vandals and the elements and even from those with the urge to remodel or
replace. One can sense the author's pride of the region throughout the volume
but especially in the first four chapters in which he offers a brief general history.
The major portion of the book, twenty-eight chapters, is devoted to a description
of each mission or church. There is some unevenness in coverage along with occasional long quotations probably stemming from the fact that Prince wrote
segments or chapters at different times during his long residence in New Mexico.
The lawyer-historian did a creditable job.
After much thought and planning the publishers of Rio Grande Press, specialists in facsimile reproductions of out-of-print but significant historical writings,
decided to offer Prince's work to aficionados of New Mexico history. A handsome new edition it is, indeed. The original photographs have been superbly supplemented by the addition of 123 nt:w ones (forty-five in color), and by seventeen
excellent, first-ever reproductions of mission paintings by Gerald Cassidy,
William P. Henderson, Regina Tatum Cooke, and especially Carlos Vierra. In
addition, there is a new publisher's preface, an interesting introduction on
Governor Prince, an up-to-date II x 16 location map, and a twelve-page index
prepared by Kirk Ellis. The new edition is considerably larger in size than the
original, beautifully bound and well worth the price.
College of Santa Fe

WALTERJ. DONLON

WILDERNESS CALLING: THE HARDEMAN FAMILY IN THE AMERICAN WESTWARD
MOVEMENT, 1750-1900. By Nicolas Perkins Hardeman. Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1977. Pp. xiv, 357. Illus., maps, notes, index. $14.95.
NICHOLAS HARDEMAN'S STORY is blessed not only with a favorable geographythe American West-but also with a family whose experiences create in
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microcosm a social history of frontier America. Beginning with the patriarch of
the family, Thomas Hardeman of Albemarle and his migration to the North
Carolina backcountry, and continuing through four generations of Hardemans,
the author skillfully chronicles their movement across the continent. Hardemans
settled the Cumberland valley, extended their enterprise into Missouri Territory,
helped draft constitutions for Tennessee, Missouri, California and the Texas
Republic, travelled wagon roads to Santa Fe and the Oregon country, took part
in the fight for Texas independence, sojourned in the diggings on the Yuba River
in 1848, fought on both sides during the Civil War, and, down to the official
close of the frontier in 1890, worked on cattle drives and helped to man military
posts from Arizona to Montana. Few families, within the present limit of
historical research, played such a conspicuous part in the development of the
West over a longer period of time.
Yet Wilderness Calling is more than a simple tale of westward expansion. It is
rather a family history that combines various themes and events in a panoramic
view that reaches beyond the parochial limits of western Americana. The
author's final chapter on the theoretical burdens of western history is of added
usefulness. He rejects the usual explanations for western migration-Manifest
Destiny, free land, "safety valve," economic determinism-in favor of a culturebased analysis that looks to the family, the principal social institution of
nineteenth-century America, for the source of migrating tendencies.
Professor Hardeman (California State University, Long Beach) maintains a
family tradition for gifted storytelling, with the added maturity of a competent
scholar. If at times he seems to endow his forebears with many of the rugged virtues traditionally associated with the frontier, he has tempered the celebration
with a more objective analysis of their proper place within the history of each
region successively occupied in the family's advance to the Pacific barrier. Taking his material from a variety of sources, both public and private, the author
has created a work that should be of great interest to students of Western history,
and should also serve future scholars as a model for continuing research into the
"westward impulse."

Northern Arizona University

L. G. MOSES

HAMLIN GARLAND'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE AMERICAN INDIAN. 1895-1905. Edited
by Lonnie E. Underhill and Daniel F. Littlefield, Jr. Tucson: The University of
Arizona Press, 1976. Pp. x, 214. lIlus., maps, bibliog., index. Cloth $9.95,
paper $4.95.
WHEN HAMLIN GARLAND came to the Far West for the first time in 1892, he
reacted to the Rockies and the West Coast like a school boy on the first day of
vacation. And his enthusiasm increased as he visited other parts of the West in
the next two years. But a different purpose impelled him west in 1895: he and artist friends came to see Indians, to visit reservations, and to write about and
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sketch what they saw. This trip was a turning point in Garland's career. For the
next decade or so, he toured many reservations, wrote numerous essays, stories,
and a novel about what he saw and heard. And for the remainder of his life he
drew upon these experiences for his fiction and autobiographical writings.
In the volume under review, Underhill and Littlefield collect thirteen essays
that Garland wrote between 1895 and 1905. Four of the articles appeared in
magazines during that decade, four were edited and published in historical journals in the 1970s, and five appear here in scholarly form for the first time. Seven
of the essays recount Garland's travels to reservations in Arizona and New Mexico, and four center on Indian groups in Montana. The two remaining essays"The Red Man's Present Needs" (1902) and "The Red Man as Material"
(1903)-deal with general topics and are the most significant pieces in the
volume; significant for understanding Garland's views and notable for application to the continuing discussions of ethnic diversity in contemporary America.
hi the opening fifty pages of the volume, the editors show how Garland used
the materials gathered on his visits in his subsequent writings. Also, each essay is
introduced with background information, and the meaning of each article is
augmented through useful explanatory footnotes. These notes arc drawn primarily from the work of Frederick Webb Hodge, a few secondary works, agency
reports, and newspapers. Some manuscript research is evident in the notes dealing with an incident in Montana that Garland used in his novel The Captain of
the Gray-Horse Troop (1902).
A few additions would have made the volume stronger. The introduction is
narrowly focused on Garland's writings and lacks comparisons and contrasts
between his works and those of contemporaries such as Owen Wister, Frederic
Remington, Jack London, and Mary Austin, who wrote about Indians at the
same time that Garland was recording his observations. Nor do the editors make
use of secondary sources on the literary treatment of Indians at the turn of the
century. Material in recent dissertations by Brian Dippie, Priscilla Oaks Shames,
and Charles Roberts would have added a great c1eal on this subject. And for those
readers unacquainted with American Indian history of the late nineteenth century, the discussions of the Dawes Act and policies of allotment are too skimpy to
be of much help. Underhill and Littlefield frequently refer to conflicts in racial
relations and hint at Garland's part in the cultural dramas of his times, but these'
references are vague. Had the editors been more detailed and explicit, their
book would be more useful.
On the other hand, the essays do illuminate Garland's reactions to the Indian.
They reveal a thoughtful, sympathetic liberal who attempts to make sense of
Indian-white relations, who criticizes current policies, and who suggests better
alternatives. Generally, Garland thinks allotment is not working well because
whites are land hungry and unwilling to help Indians make the slow and uncertain steps toward adjustment. Garland wants more schools, more women as
administrators on reservations, and a larger willingness on the part of agents and
missionaries to allow Indians to retain their social and religious customs.
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Garland changes in the 1895-1905 period; he seems to recognize the prejudices
of his cultural backgro.md, and he moves beyond these barriers in his later and
more positive comments on the nature of Indian culture. His points of view have
a contemporary ring, and for presentists the volume contains lessons from the
past that are applicable to present dilemmas.

Idaho State University

RICHARD W. ETULAIN

TRAVIS. By Archie P. McDonald. Austin: Jenkins Publishing Company, 1976. Pp.
214. Notes, bibliog., illus., index. $12.50.
IN 1836 William Barret Travis became inextricably linked with the Alamo and
Texas. As commander of the beleaguered San Antonio garrison facing General
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, he became a symbol of courage and freedom, of
man's age-old fight against oppression, of the American belief in dying as free
people rather than living as slaves. Then with his famous letter of February 24
"to the people of Texas & all Americans in the world" he achieved instant
renown; for few statements in history have ever carried a greater emotional impact than his concluding literary comment- "I am determined to sustain myself
as long as possible and die like a soldier who never forgets what is due to his own
honor and that of his country- VICTORY OR DEATH" (p. 165).
Yet Archie McDonald, an American historian at Stephen F. Austin State
University, has sought to humanize Travis, to strip away the rhetoric and drama
surrounding the Texas Revolution so that the reader might separate myth from
reality. He has therefore revealed an impulsive, vainglorious, extremely ambitious individual who was determined to build a noteworthy reputation. Most
likely fleeing from an unhappy marriage in 1831, Travis arrived in Texas only to
demonstrate further his lack of understanding concerning women. His "physical
appetites" and immense egotism even prompted him to number female conquests
and describe such amorous encounters in a diary (p. 58). In June, 1832, his
precipitous actions at Anahuac, which forced Captain Antonio Tenorio and
twelve soldiers to surrender, caused him much embarrassment and public -:ensure, that is, until the Mexican military foolishly ordered his arrest; Travis thus
eluded the "goat" appellation and moved toward the "hero" category. Then during the summer and fall of 1835 his quick promotions from second lieutenant to
lieutenant colonel in the Texas army, which ultimately placed him at the Alamo,
demonstrated clearly, as McDonald points out, his ambition "to make his mark
in the world, to assemble a fortune, and to be remembered" (pp. 99-100).
So in Travis, the reader will find the best biography written thus far on this
Texas hero. Although not a literary work of art, it is clear, direct, and objective.
In fact, McDonald discusses in detail all myths connected with the Travis legend,
thereby explaining the man without debunking him.

Texas Christian University
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A CLASH OF INTERESTS: INTERIOR DEPARTMENT AND MOUNTAIN WEST 1863-96. By
Thomas G. Alexander. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1977. Pp.
256. Maps, notes, bibliog., index.
IN ASTRIKING ANALYSIS of territorial government in the United States Thomas G.
Alexander has examined the collective experiences of Idaho, Utah, and Arizona
to argue his hypothesis that the federal government in the years 1863-1896
forced a political and institutional conformity that ran against the best interests
of the actual settlers of these territories. Contrary to the situation in the twentieth century, when citizens of these states dutifully and even thankfully altered
certain cultural patterns in return for substantial federal spending, their
nineteenth-century counterparts resented the strong arm of Washington, even
though more federal money came into these territories than went out.
Because of this paradoxical response the author contends that an understanding of the problem is beyond the realm of quantitative economics and analysis.
Rather, it came down to ideological constructs and practical considerations. The
principal ideological failure was the inability of Washington bureaucrats to
perceive that conditions in the' underdeveloped Mountain West militated
against the application of yeoman farmer models and state-making strategies
used in the Midwest and elsewhere. This was especially the case with regard to
land policy, irrigation, and the group-oriented cultures of the Mormons and
Indians; and, to a lesser degree, in the areas of ranching and timber
management.
On a more practical level federal insensitivity was aggravated by the lack of
political power in the territories which in turn created a vacuum that allowed
Congress to ignore real needs almost at will. External political considerations too
often dominated local political affairs, with the result that the normal functioning of territorial government was disrupted. In a strong indictment against the
federal "fetish" of efficient, central organization, author Alexander concludes
with a plea for greater utilization of creative energies at the local level. Then,
and perhaps only then, will conflicting ideologies be tempered by more practical
solutions to the day-to-day problems of the Mountain West.
That this study is an important contribution to Western institutional history is
undeniable. The author has marshalled an impressive body of evidence without
taking cover under the umbrella of empirical certainty. Yet nowhere is there any
serious consideration of the basic constitutional issues involved. No mention of
Calhoun, who surely deserves some mention whenever the problem of regionalism in American life comes up. No mention of the work of Arthur Bestor or
Dwight Morrow as they have dealt with the issues of regional autonomy and territorial expansiJn. And no mention of James Malin who years ago decried the
withering impact of technology and centralization at the territorial and early
statehood levels.
For a book that purports to deal with a major region of the Mountain West
there is too much emphasis on the Utah experience. Some important journal
literature on Indian policy and the federal bureaucracy has been ignored, and
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the analogy between beleagured Mormons and Indians vis-a-vis well-known Interior Department ineptitude is more suggestive than supportive of the cultural
pluralism so strongly advocated by the author.
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WILLIAM E. UNRAU

CONTACT AND CONFLICT: INDIAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA,
177 4-1890. By Robin Fisher. Vancouver: University of Columbia Press, 1977.
Illus., bibliog., index. $18.00.
ROBIN FISHER offers the reader the opportunity to examine the long, rich history
of the Indians of British Columbia from the early days of the fur trade through
settlement by Europeans. Fisher shows a scholar's detachment and does not accept most of the preconceptions common to so many works that touch on IndianEuropean relations. For example, while his chapter on the maritime fur trade
offers only a brief analysis of the trade, it is clearly demonstrated that the
characterization of the trade as exploitation of the Indians, so common to
historical literature, is not supportable. True, there were some traders who may
have made remarkable profits, primarily in the early days of the trade; and there
were others involved in incidents that could be described as exploitive. However,
as a whole, the trade was a mutually profitable enterprise in which the Indian
was in a position to exert a degree of independence and equality. Fisher traces the
theme of Indian-European relationships through the period of land-based fur
trade and demonstrates that the Indian societies continued to be viable. While
there were changes, particularly of an economic nature, the Indians continued to
enjoy traditional values.
With the coming of the miners, followed by the settlers and the usual retinue of
missionaries, bureaucrats, etc., the lot of the Indian peoples of British Columbia
deteriorated steadily. With essential religious traditions, particularly potlatches,
outlawed, the Indian societies were hard-put to retain their integrity. The author
examined in detail the decline of various Indian groups as traditional trade,
hunting, and fishing patterns were disrupted until one sees men and women of
once prosperous groups reduced to drunkenness and prostitution. It is perhaps
ironic that once the Europeans had reduced the Indian to this sad state, they then
used the condition of the Indian as a justification for his removal from desirable
lands which were then developed by Europeans.
By 1890, the end of the period examined by the author, little was left of the
native societies in the region. At this point, American readers may be inclined to
view the development as parallel to the pattern in their own country. One should
be cautious, however. While there are many instances of violence perpetrated on
the Indians examined in this study, the severity and frequency hardly bear comparison to the usual patterns in the United. States. Libraries with an interest in
North American Indians will find this volume a valuable addition to their collections.
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